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A fundamental understanding of the complexities comprising an information security 
strategy (ISS) in an organization is lacking.  Most ISS implementations in government 
organizations equate anti-virus or installing a firewall to that of an ISS.  While use of hardware 
and software forms a good defense; neither comprises the essence of an ISS.  The ISS best 
integrates with business and information system strategies from the start, forming and shaping 
the direction of overall strategy synergistically within large government organizations.  The 
researcher used grounded theory and investigated what a large government organization’s 
choices were with the differing roles an information security professional (ISP) chooses to 
operate with and to develop an information security program.  Analysis of the data collected 
from interviewing 32 chief information security officers (CISOs) revealed how CISOs viewed 
their programs, aligned their goals in the organization, and selected role(s) to execute strategy.  
Use of grounded theory coding practices of the interviews showed a deficit in complexities of an 
ISS and a lack of an ISS in the majority of organizations.  The participants came from multiple 
organizations in the National Capital Region on the east coast of the United States. This study 
advances the body of knowledge in a qualitative understanding of actions taken by CISOs to 
select a direction towards ISS implementation, role selection, and development of information 
security programs.  It provides a theory for further testing of strategy development and role 
maturity. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Evidence of the Problem 
 
Traditionally, business forms the overall strategic direction of an organization through its 
vision disseminated in the business strategy (Cohen & Cyert, 1973; Miller, 1981; Wommack, 
1979).  With the advent of automation, the information technology department or function 
creates the information systems strategy to automate and align to the vision of the business 
strategy (Doherty & Fulford, 2006).  The speed and breadth with which information systems 
penetrated business brought about the need for information systems to consider information 
security for two reasons.  First, to protect the information entrusted to the organization residing 
in their information systems; second, to keep information technology assets defended from being 
vulnerable from compromise; and to keep the information owners apprised as to whether a 
breach occurs with their data and their automated information systems become compromised 
(Gilbert, 2008; McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2011; Smedinghoff, 2005).  Through this, 
business and information technology are concerned with information security, to ensure an 
information system’s usefulness to their users (Eloff & von Solms, 2000). 
One of senior management’s objectives is to ensure the prevention of data loss and avoid 
possible damage to their organizational reputation.  Another objective focuses on building 
defenses to protect automation assets to prevent compromise (Anderson, 2003; Dlamini, Eloff, & 
Eloff, 2009; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Knapp & Boulton, 2006).  An organization’s reputation 
and possibly their economic survival depends upon having a secure environment as one of the 
important factors to operate securely from malicious threats, such as individuals trying to 
2 
 
socially engineer passwords and user names from unsuspecting personnel on the network, who 
could then infiltrate the network to exfiltrate information by siphoning activities (Bhalla, 2003; 
Hinde, 2003; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Oreku & Mtenzi, 2009).  The costs associated with 
remediating data breaches such as notifying victims of lost data and repair of public trust can be 
excessive (Baskerville, 1993; Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Garg, Curtis, 
& Halper, 2003; Rowe & Gallaher, 2006).  The organization, through senior management 
interaction seeks to have an effective information security strategy in place (Kayworth & 
Whitten, 2010; Loveland & Lobel, 2011). 
The term information security strategy is often misunderstood.  Organizational 
management views it as a necessary implementation of technical security controls and devices to 
keep people out of the organization’s computers (Chang & Yeh, 2006).  Information security is 
more than just technical security measures implemented, to meet regulatory demands 
(Damianides, 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2006; Keen & El Sawy, 2010; Kim, 2004; Luftman & 
Ben-Zvi, 2010; Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2011).  Information security works with information 
technology to ensure the automated environment remains secure, preventing outside infiltration 
and internal misuse of devices and systems.  Specifically, information security requires policy 
and governance (Posthumous & von Solms, 2004; von Solms 2006) and an information security 
strategy containing structured actions to meet an organization’s policy and governance (White & 
Bruton, 2011); orchestrating an overall plan of action for the organization.  The information 
security function within an organization works to formalize the information security strategy, a 
plan to implement protection of the information and intellectual property the organization uses to 
conduct business (Chen, Kataria, & Krishnan, 2011; Hinde, 2003; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; 
Mahmood, Siponen, Straub, Rao, & Raghu, 2010) from attackers who attempt to copy, delete, 
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manipulate or destroy information.  Information security needs to somehow remain one step 
ahead of attackers (Bhalla, 2003; Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Howard & Longstaff, 1998). 
1.2 Research Problem 
 
In the literature there has been a call for a formal approach to information security that 
goes beyond implementation of technical controls (Dhillon, 1995; Herath & Rao, 2009; Ma, 
Johnston, & Pearson, 2008; Parkin & van Moorsel, 2009; Parakktu, 2010).  Some researchers 
have emphasized the need for well developed strategies (Anderson & Choobineh, 2008; Hall, 
Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2011; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 
2011; Park & Ruighaver, 2008; Tejay, 2008).  There has also been a call for information security 
to be more proactive rather than being reactive (Tejay, 2008).  However, there is a dearth of 
studies focusing on the subject of information security strategy itself.  The purpose of this study 
is to understand the complexities of information security strategy in a large government 
organization. 
Exploring the problem examines the complexities of information security strategy 
primarily in what the differing roles an information security professional chooses to operate and 
how a large government organization proceeds to develop an information security program 
through the strategy.  The latter, how an organization proceeds specifically to develop 
information security programs is with the vehicle defined as an information security strategy.  
Delving into the information security strategy composition and answering what an information 
security strategy means might grant insight into its construction.  Looking into the construction 
can help to ascertain whether certain types of information security strategy are preferable over 
other forms of information security strategy under certain conditions.  If so, it would also be 
helpful to understand how information security strategies differ within a large governmental 
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organization under study.  Then, assuming there are multiple types of information security 
strategies, it would be helpful to search for ways in which an information security professional 
differentiates one information security strategy from another by performing appropriate roles to 
implement information security. 
With the second area, when an information security professional differentiates one 
information security strategy from another, the person assumes a strategic role in order to 
perform information security duties.  The process of selection leads to exploring the various 
strategic roles available for the information security professional towards accomplishment of 
information security.  Various aspects of the roles and their selection were explored to assist in 
furthering an understanding of the process.  This effort looks at what the other roles used for 
information security accomplishment are and what differentiates one role from another, whether 
each role involves a formal process, and if there is an optimum role for a specific information 
security strategy. 
The argument of this study is that the literature is silent on role selection and explaining 
how a large governmental organization develops roles.  There is a need to investigate what 
different roles are being used by government organizations.  It would be of assistance to 
understand which types of information security strategy were preferable over other forms of 
information security strategy and under certain conditions.  If so, it would be helpful to 
understand how a large, multifaceted government organization differs within one another in the 
accomplishment of information security.  Most actions by an information security professional 
tend to be in response to an action, instead of methodically planning out responses.  These 
reactive responses often lead to sometimes choosing incorrectly for given information security 
needs.  In order to mitigate the reactive approaches, an information security professional should 
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evaluate the existing security strategies adopted by various organizations.  The professional 
should be able to categorize the observed strategies of other organizations and select the correct 
direction to move an organization forward to meet the mission specified in the information 
security program.  
Whether consciously or not, organizations do take actions related to information security.  
There is a need to understand those actions.  They are the organization’s strategies.  Tejay (2008) 
argued the need to pay attention to the context of an organization in order to be successful.  
There must be an understanding of the connection between what the information security 
strategy requires and the role(s) necessary to work out the tenets of the information security 
strategy.  Differing business and information systems requirements drive the contexts with which 
the information security professional connects the information security strategy to meet 
objectives of information security.  It would be helpful to understand how different information 
security strategies actually in use in different organizations emphasize meeting their objectives 
(McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2007; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).    To this end, the goal 
would be to produce a theoretical model from the collected data.  In Chapter 3, a complete 
discourse covered how the collected data was solicited from professionals and used to construct a 
possible theoretical model for use in large governmental organizations.  This may assist in future 
studies to understand how organizations differ, utilizing the model to predict role selection.  The 
use of grounded theory research by data collection techniques allowed the emergent data to feed 
the building of a theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Corbin & Strauss 2008). 
1.3 Definitions 
One attribute of establishing understanding is to have a common core of communications 
between all stakeholders.  This can be realized through the establishment of a common lexicon, a 
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taxonomy of definitions, considering the positions other researchers have adopted and share in 
common (Alter, 2008).  A common lexicon assists people in communicating principles and 
convey meaning, especially in the area of strategy.   
The vast coverage of information systems has had an influence in the field of business 
strategic management (Chan & Huff, 1992) and has influenced information systems strategy 
(Chen, et al., 2010).  Some discussion has taken place with information security strategy as well 
(Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008; Ezingread, et al., 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et 
al., 2011).  In this chapter a discussion of strategy from the literature in three areas and moves 
through definitions of business strategy, information systems strategy and information security 
strategy. 
1.3.1 Strategy.  
Gavetti and Rivkin (2005) stated strategy is about choice, choosing what to do and what 
not to do, which affects the outcomes of an organization.  While their article focused on choice, 
other articles focus on exactly what a strategy is (Alter, 2008; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2005; 
Mintzberg, 1987a; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998; Wommack, 1979), what a strategy is 
composed of (Cohen & Cyert, 1973), and how to develop and shape strategy (Gavetti & Rivkin, 
2005; Wommack, 1979).  Many researchers have devised models for strategies (Dunkerley, 
2011; Ezingeard, et.al., 2005; Kankankalli, Tan, Teo, & Wei, 2003; Ma, Johnston, & Pearson, 
2008; McClean & Kark, 2010; Rose, 2011), which attempts to capture the essence of strategy, 
but none have received discipline wide acceptance (Markides, 1999).  Some of these models 
include Porter’s five-forces model (Porter, 1980), and eight more are explained by Mintzberg & 
Waters (1985) for structuring strategy.  The difficulty in an established definition might be 
explained more easily if consideration of two other aspects of strategy were reviewed, that of the 
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characteristics of decision making with strategy, and the issues around the differing levels of 
strategy. 
The second subset of strategy is characteristics of decision making.   This is the decision 
between strategic and non-strategic matters over the long term, their expected impacts, and the 
directional movement of strategy by decisions being made while performing the plan (Chen, et 
al., 2010).  The third aspect is over the level in which a strategy operates.  Some identify the 
corporate level (Porter, 1980), the competitive advantage level (Grant, 2005), and the functional 
strategy or resource allocation level (Hofer & Schendel, 1978).  Others liken the strategy to the 
strategic, tactical, and operational levels respectively of a complete strategy (Grobler & 
Louwrens, 2005; da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  Either of these choices drives a strategy into 
managing the direction of an organization towards achieving a goal.     
The strategy as a management plan of action is to achieve an objective, identified by 
milestones or markers to show progress towards achieving the objective (Chen, et al., 2010; 
King, 1978).   This study observes the strategy in three areas of an organization, the business, 
information systems, and information security units based upon the business of the organization 
(McFadzean, et al., 2007). 
1.3.2 Strategy in Business  
Strategy in business is the integration of an organization’s goals, policies, and actions, 
which appears as a plan or pattern of a cohesive whole (Tejay, 2008).  In ‘Crafting strategy’, 
Mintzberg (1987b, In Tejay 2008) defined strategy as the five ‘P’s’, which are plan, ploy, 
pattern, position, and perspective.  More specifically, Mintzberg stated: 
“…strategy can be defined as (1) a plan (i.e., some sort of consciously intended 
course of action); (2) a ploy (which is a specific maneuver intended to outperform 
a competitor); (3) a pattern (i.e., a stream of realized actions); (4) a position (i.e. a 
means of matching between an organization and its external environment); and 
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(5) a perspective (which is shared among organizational members, and the content 
of which consists of not just a position, but also an ingrained way of perceiving 
the world) (Mintzberg, 1987, In Chen, et al., 2010).”  
1.3.3 Information Systems Strategy  
A majority of the literature defines information systems strategy as an outgrowth of 
business strategy, in how to calculate the output of information systems in order to maximize 
profits (Chen, et al., 2010).  King (1978) states management information systems should 
contribute by increasing earnings, reducing resources, and increasing reputation.  Supporting 
this, Mata, Fuerst, and Barney (1995) stated information technology is one of the sources for 
sustaining competitive advantage by reducing costs and or increasing revenue.  Johnson and 
Lederer (2010) built upon the previous by saying the information system’s contribution has a 
fivefold strategic contribution: customer satisfaction, sales revenue, market share, return on 
investment, and operating efficiency.  In all, information systems strategy supports the 
organization’s strategy to increase the output of the organization and streamlining output through 
information systems (Chen, et al., 2010).   
1.3.4 Information Systems Security 
Traditionally, information systems security is perceived to mainly secure the technical 
and operational aspects of an information system, to protect the data (Anderson, 2003; de Paula, 
Ding, Dourish, Nies, Pillet, Redmiles, Ren, Rode, & Filho, 2005; Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; 
Kim, 2004; Ruighaver, 2008; Vijayan, 2005; Zhang & Bao; 2010). There is however, a lack of 
an acceptable definition across the industry for an information security strategy which hampers 
the acceptance of a common definition (Alter, 2008; Anderson, 2003).  Strategy as presented by 
White & Bruton (2011), states, “Strategy is a coordinated set of actions that fulfill a firm’s 
objectives, purposes, and goals.”  Which leads into an observation by Baskerville and Dhillon 
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(2008), that the term strategy is used very loosely in the literature, even though strategy is quite 
complex.    
The complexity can be seen in how Mintzberg (1987b) examined five views of managing 
strategy as a plan, ploy, pattern, positioning, and a perspective.  To which Baskerville and 
Dhillon (2008) expand upon the definition, into ten different methods for managing strategy 
through the schools of prescriptive areas of designing and planning, and descriptive areas of 
entrepreneurial, cognitive, learning, power, culture, environmental, and configuration.  
Individually, they are all aspects of strategy, but together, even though they differ, they give a 
more holistic view of strategy and its aspects (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008).  The word chosen 
by Baskerville and Dhillon (2008) is conflated, to describe the meshing, but no specific term or 
combination of terms that embodies all of ‘strategy’, rather it is a mixture and the resulting 
selection that gave meaning to the term strategy. 
1.3.5 Information Security Strategy 
Information security strategy fits within an organizational structure as the vision of the 
security of information, providing direction for policy, contributing to governance and 
governance balancing control through compliance in a synergistic relationship of information 
security management (Klaić, 2010; Posthumus & von Solms, 2004).  The methods chosen for 
implementation of an information security strategy consisted of choices, the choice of the 
alignment and the role to execute the information security strategy to contribute to “an overall 
plan for managing and developing an organization’s information security,” (Baskerville & 
Dhillon, 2008).  This then is the chosen definition of an information security strategy. 
This research included articles which stated information security strategy should be 
aligned with business strategy, (Caralli, 2004; Dhillon, 1995; Newkirk, Lederer, & Johnson, 
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2008).  The literature defines several broad concepts for aligning business strategy with 
information systems strategy (Chan & Huff, 1992; Chen, et al., 2010), but not many studies 
discuss the alignment of information security strategy (Hall, Sarkoni, & Mazzuchi, 2011; 
McFadzean, et al., 2011). 
To reiterate, the industry looks at information security as an afterthought applied to 
obtain accreditation or answer problems when a compromise takes place.  Information security 
ends up as a reactive response rather than a proactive implementation to mitigate problems 
before the problem can cause a compromise (Hedström, Kolkowska, Karlsson, & Allen, 2011; 
Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 2007; Scully, 2011).   
Having defined the terms forming the common core of strategy, the following sections 
delineate coverage of the information security strategy.  Chapter 2 covered the treatment of the 
literature around the alignments and strategic roles of an information security strategy.  Chapter 
3 introduced the research method chosen to interact with, observe, capture, and analyze the 
actions of information security professionals in choosing roles.  Chapter 3 discussed data 
collection and the results of the data collection.  Chapter 4 analyzes the data to yield a theory of 
information security strategy in large government organizations.  The conclusion, in Chapter 5 
delineates the contribution to the field of knowledge in information security, and recommends 
future areas of research. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature covered a broad swath of information security, since the field of 
information security is relatively young and still forming (Anderson, 2003; Kritzinger & Smith, 
2008).   This research included articles from a spectrum of information security (governance, 
policy, management, and compliance) containing sections and items of interest having a direct 
bearing on strategy (Klaić, 2010; Kritzinger & Smith, 2008; Ohki, Harada, Kawaguchi, Shiozaki, 
& Kagaua, 2009; Siponen, 2005b).    
2.2 Review of the Literature 
In many journal articles, the subject of information security strategy was broached, but 
not directly addressed as such.  Authors may not have concerned themselves directly with a 
discussion of strategy, but did inject references as to vision and contribution to an overall plan of 
management and development of information security (Bhalla, 2003; Damianides, 2005; Doherty 
& Fulford, 2005; Doherty & Fulford, 2006).  The researcher identified direct and indirect 
references to information security strategy and categorized them into terms captured in Table 1, 
Definition Sources. 
Forming the information security strategy embodied the outlook of the leader and the 
organization, which was their vision (Salmela & Spil, 2002).  The information security strategy 
was the outcome of taking the vision’s goals, objectives and priorities and matching them to the 
organizational strategy (Moen & Norman, 2000; Salmela & Spil, 2002).  Subsequent steps in the 
information security strategy development process included consideration of strategic, tactical, 
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and operational goals of the organization (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Grobler & Louwrens, 2005). 
Table 1, Definition Sources identifies the multiple terms used and ways in which contributions    
Table 1. Definition Sources 
Term used Explanation Source 
Cybersecurity 
-Architecture 
-Managerial 
-Security policy 
Security was part of the overall strategy Knapp & Boulton, 2006; 
McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 
2007 
Cybersecurity Strategy Advantages and disadvantages revealed in strategies as proactive and 
reactive 
Rowe & Gallaher 2006 
“Protect digital assets” of people and organizations Ghernouti-Hélie, 2010 
Enterprise Strategic Security  Measured at every level, associated with risk acceptance Anderson & Choobineh, 2008 
Information Assurance 
Strategy 
Aligning with corporate strategy to provide best security and 
availability of information assets 
Ezingeard, McFadzean, & Birchall, 
2005 
Information Security 
Management Strategy 
 
Security strategy as a part of governance, a driver of the organization Grobler & Louwrens, 2005 
Used management to implement a strategic approach to security Doherty & Fulford, 2005 
Information security management strategy and how it aligned with 
business 
Ma, Johnson, & Pearson, 2008 
Inductive Strategy Used to understand individual and organizational levels Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009 
Information Security 
Planning 
Though not defined, a strategy of risk planning prevailed Straub & Welke, 1998 
Information Security 
Strategy (with propositions) 
 
Part of security governance along with responsibilities long and short 
term; A part of the overall program 
Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Shoraka 
2011 
Approaches to answering risks and costs Daneva, 2006 
Strategically aligned with business; Information Security Strategy aligns 
with business strategy; Aligns with business strategy to combine 
business objectives and competitive advantages; Embodied the plan to 
align with corporate strategy; Was a key enabler of corporate strategy 
Amaio, 2009;  Chang & Ho, 2006; 
Dynes, Kolbe, & Schierholz, 2007; 
Hall, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2011; 
Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; van 
Niekerk & von Solms, 2010 
Pro-active to identify and adopt strategy Arce & Levy, 2009 
Leads to competitive advantage Vasiu, Mackay, & Warren, (2003) 
Factors for contextual background, common threats, and addresses 
barriers 
Lomprey, 2008 
Information Security Strategy supported strong protection of patient 
records 
Love, 2011 
Directors used risk assessment to draft the information security strategy McFadzean, et al., 2007 
Information Security Strategy as a technical remediation response Park & Ruighaver, 2008 
Information security strategy as a part of the governance structure Posthumus & von Solms, 2004 
Information Security Strategy along with capabilities yields 
organizational performance 
Hall, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2010 
Information Systems 
Security Strategy 
 
Strategy inferred as a part of managing and not a technical solution for 
implementation 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006 
Well-developed strategies result from balanced strategies in business, 
information systems and information system security strategies 
Chang & Yeh, 2006 
Alignment of business with security strategy and also discusses in great 
detail about strategic integration to support business strategy 
McFadzean, et al., 2011 
IT Security Strategy Evaluation of risk resulted in IT security strategy Goluch, et. al., 2008 
Technical focus on devices and lock-down of systems Doughty, 2003 
Intrusion Strategy 
Defense in Depth Strategy 
Compared nature to the methods of strategy Oreku & Mtenzi, 2009 
IT Information Strategy Security approached strategically Von Solms, 2006 
IT Security Strategy IT Security Strategy as a part of risk analysis Von Solms, 1998a 
(Law Enforcement) Strategy Design strategy from the beginning, then built in afterwards Anderson & Moore, 2006 
Security initiatives Aligned strategy with business strategy Booker, 2006 
Security Strategy 
 
 
Formulation of security strategy involved people and processes Zhang & Bao, 2010 
Compared cost and benefits weighing risks Geer, 2007 
Methods for instituting strategy through committees for implementation Smith, 2004 
Strategy 
 
Integrated part of the overall strategy Ahuja, 2009 
Defined as formulating according to the scenarios encountered Abbas & Hemani, 2010 
Proactive protection needed strategy to be proactive Bhalla, 2003 
Strategic Change Strategic change enables business goals as new requirements or 
capabilities emerge 
Werlinger, Hawkey, & Beznosov, 
2009 
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were made to an information security strategy.  The following captures how these definition 
sources aligned with information security and the information security strategy.  These usually 
mapped to long range for strategic, mid-range for tactical and short range for operational goals.  
The information security strategy was divided into three sections allowing personnel to track 
short, mid, and long range periods of time (King, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Wommack, 
1979).  Benchmarks or milestones helped to indicate markers for effective performance in 
security (Allen, 2005; Eloff & von Solms, 2000; McFadzean, et al., 2011; Ohki, et al., 2009).  If 
the information security strategy underperformed, it frequently manifested problems at the 
tactical and operational levels within an organization (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  Problems could 
occur even before an information security strategy was ever implemented in an organization 
(Scully, 2011).  An indication of this might be writing, approving, and then filing away of the 
information security strategy before anyone ever acted upon it (Rose, 2011).  In which case, 
people or personnel duly responsible for accomplishment of the ideals of the information 
security strategy may never have known about the strategy.  Practical pressures to meet 
operational or tactical requirements intervened and in such cases, the strategy was put away until 
time was available to complete the goals of even the operational level (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; 
Grobler & Louwrens, 2005). The factors involved with these events are complex and diverse.  
Information security has worked to correctly identify, analyze, and correlate 
organizational factors to improve information security strategy formulation, development, and 
implementation (Chang & Ho, 2006; Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 2007; Kankanhalli, et al., 2003; 
Parakkattu, et al., 2010).  Through this process, the information security strategy advanced from 
merely being technical solutions to secure entry and exit points of a network (Ghernouti-Helie, 
2010; Hinde, 2003; Seeholzer, 2012; Zhang & Bao, 2010) to become fully developed plans of 
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action (Aivazian, 1998; Bower & Gilbert, 2007).  The information security strategy has even 
progressed above the stage of composing and implementing many information security 
management products, such as: policies, checklists, guidebooks, creating multiple governance 
structures, and identifying many success and effectiveness frameworks (Dunkerley & Tejay, 
2009; Eloff & von Solms, 2000; Goluch, Ekelhart, Fenz, Jakoubi, Tjoa, & Mück, 2008, Siponen, 
2005b; Zhang, Wuwang, Li, & Zhang, 2010).   
What remained in question was why an information security strategy still did not function 
properly within the structure of policy and governance in the hierarchy of information security 
management within an organization (Cecere, 2011; Dawson, Berrell, Rahim, & Brewster, 2010; 
Dhillon, 2007; Kotulic & Clark, 2004; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Wang, 2009, Wood 2000).  This 
study collected data about interactions of information security professionals and the roles chosen 
to implement information security and analyzed the data to result in a theory.  
In some organizations, security was performed at minimum levels, in order to gain initial 
approval to connect to or operate the network (Anderson & Moore, 2006; Wang, 2009).  
Afterwards, the organizations relegated security to the level of necessity in order to maintain 
approval for operational use.  Organizations then became complacent about continued use 
(Dougherty & Fulford, 2005).  Evident of this was the fact that organizations conducted many 
meetings about implementing strategy, but ended up putting off difficult decisions (Wommack, 
1979).  Organizations implemented a form of security, such as technical security controls to deal 
with known threats (Damianides, 2005; Gilbert, 2008; Smedinghoff, 2005), but often choose not 
to employ management of information security to look for the unknown threat, before or as it 
developed (Anderson, 1993; Butler & Gray, 2006; Dhillon, 1995).  Rather, organizations only 
implemented regulatory requirements, mandated by law.  A prevailing presumption was that 
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security only slowed down the speed of processing on computer systems (Post & Kagan, 2007; 
Scully, 2011). 
Some of the factors used to explain this strategic approach concerned a management 
approach wherein they were aware of security threats, but refused to believe bad events would 
happen to them (Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Scully, 2011).  In spite of the security threats, 
management became self-assured, believing they were invincible and data loss would not happen 
to them (Scully, 2011; Straub, 1990).  Possibly, the largest initial hindrance came from program 
managers, who were charged to keep their programs on time, under budget, and over utilized 
constrained resources, which invariably ended up as a detriment of security, which eventually 
removed or limited security from the budget (Hinde, 2000; Kark, 2010; Wang, 2009). 
 Ideally, the information security strategy developed by organizations evolved from 
interaction with multiple information security professionals.  Their experiences in executing 
duties were applied to fulfill their portion of the business strategy, information systems strategy, 
and the information security strategy (Anderson & Choobineh, 2008; Hall, Sarkoni, & Mazzuchi, 
2011; Knapp & Boulton, 2006; Parakkattu & Kunnathur, 2010).  A method such as compliance, 
used security controls alone, in order to achieve a minimum level of security.  Compliance 
dominated the Federal sector of organizations (Dhillon, 1995; Herath & Rao, 2009; Ma, 
Johnston, & Pearson, 2008; Ma, Schmidt, Pearson, 2009; Siponen, 2006).  Compliance was 
undertaken, to meet legal mandates such as the Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA) and the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), as the 
regulating documents of information security (Damianides, 2005).  Other organizations used 
compliance methods such as those for financial organizations using the Graham Leach Bliley 
Act (GLBA) and or industry regulation under the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
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Standards (PCI-DSS) for protection of personal financial information (Al-Hamdini, 2009; 
Damianides, 2005; Gilbert, 2008; Smedinghoff, 2005).  Still other methods that information 
security professionals utilized in information security strategy formulation resulted from the 
reorganization of the information security structure or the hierarchy of the information security 
functions within their organization.  Reorganization is done to meet new business and or 
information systems goals set forth from management or to address shortfalls identified and 
addressed through moving or restructuring of the organization (Avgerou & McGrath, 2007; 
Cecere, 2008; Hansen, et al., 2011; Kajava & Siponnen, 1996; Kotulic & Clark, 2004). 
 Compliance and reorganization formed partial responses to the problem investigated, but 
the study looked at the properties of the concepts of strategy (Smith & Medin, 1981).  It focused 
on the linkages between the alignments of strategic roles under an information security strategy 
(Chen, et al., 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Ezingeard, et al., 2005; Leidner, Lo, & Preston, 
2011; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Smith & Medin, 1981). The links between the strategies and each 
of the strategic roles were very complex and intricate (Leidner, et al., 2011).  The discussion 
started with an explanation of the properties of the strategic concepts and their alignments (Chen, 
et al., 2010; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  As an overview, the alignment of the information security 
strategy used within the structure of an organization addressed the security of the business 
strategy and its automation through information systems.  The alignment an organization should 
take was to aim towards a secure, information exchanging environment (Howard & Longstaff, 
1998; McFadzean, et al., 2011).  The alignment of an information security strategy provided the 
projected goals, objectives, and priorities the organization needs to attain for a secure, 
information exchanging environment (Bruton & White, 2011; Doherty & Fulford, 2006; 
Newkirk, et al., 2008).   
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There were many studies existing in business strategy and information systems to analyze 
the alignment of goals to mission and vision in their strategies (Chan & Reich, 2007; Earl, 1993; 
Johnson & Lederer, 2010; Mata, et al., 1995; Posthumus & von Solms, 2004; Preston & 
Karahanna, 2009; Salmela & Spil, 2002; Stanton, Guzman, Stam, & Caldera, 2003; Westerman, 
2009). However, not many discuss the alignment of information security strategy to either 
information systems or business level strategies (Leidner, et al., 2011; McFadzean, et al, 2007; 
Newkirk, et al., 2008; Tejay, 2008).  Discussion in the following section covers the areas of 
alignment unique to the information security strategy for the concepts of strategy.  
2.3 Current Alignments for an Information Security Strategy 
This section discusses the aligning of the information security strategy to explain the 
ways in which strategy was performed.  There is school of thought that there are many different 
fashions in which to execute strategy.  A total of four, possibly five methods existed for aligning 
information security strategy.  The primary strategy is the business strategy, without which the 
organization would cease to exist.  Also, an organization could not exist with only an 
information systems or information security strategy alone.   Therefore, an information security 
strategy without a business strategy would result in failure of the organization.  
The other four methods of aligning strategy focused in on information security strategy, which 
were: working with the business strategy in alignment of the information security strategy to the 
business strategy, alignment of the business strategy to the information systems strategy, 
alignment of the information security strategy to both the business and information systems 
strategies, allowing the information security strategy to operate on its own, and when the 
information security strategy was non-existent, operations does not consciously use any 
18 
 
information security strategy to perform its mission.  Refer to Table 2, Alignments with 
Information Security Strategy for a description of the alignments. 
Table 2. Alignments with Information Security Strategy 
Information 
Security 
Strategy 
Primary 
view of 
strategy, 
applying 
Mintzberg 
(1987b) 5-
P’s 
Assumptions related to the information 
security strategy development process 
Assumptions 
related to 
information 
security strategy’s 
impact and 
desired impact of 
information 
security strategy 
Assumptions 
related to 
information 
security 
strategy/Busin
ess strategic 
alignment 
  Starting 
point when 
developing 
information 
security 
strategy 
Standpoint 
taken when 
developing 
information 
security 
strategy 
Relationship 
between IS and 
Business 
strategy 
  
Align to 
business 
Plan, 
supported 
the 
organization 
directly 
Used 
business 
Strategy as 
guide 
Business-
Centric 
Information 
security 
strategy 
developed 
along with 
Business 
Ensured meeting 
goals in line with 
business strategy 
Met the 
strategy 
Align to 
Information 
Systems 
Position, 
found the 
niche within 
Information 
Systems 
Used 
Information 
Systems 
Strategy as 
guide 
Information 
Systems 
Centric 
Information 
Security 
Strategy 
develops from 
both 
Ensured meeting 
goals in line with 
Information 
Systems Strategy 
Assisted the 
strategy 
through 
information 
systems 
Align to 
Information 
Systems 
and 
Business 
Plan & 
Position, 
supported & 
found the 
niche 
Used both 
Business & 
Information 
Systems 
Strategies 
Business & 
Information 
Systems 
Centric 
Information 
Security 
Strategy 
developed 
from both 
Business & 
Information 
Systems 
Strategy 
Ensured meeting 
goals in line with 
Business & 
Information 
Systems 
Strategies 
Met/Assisted 
the strategy 
through 
information 
systems 
Operated 
on its own 
Perspective, 
focused on 
strict role of 
law 
Used law & 
regulation as 
guide 
Business & 
Organizatio
n Centric 
Information 
Security 
Strategy 
developed in 
isolation, met 
Information 
Security 
Requirements 
Identified asset 
requirement and 
ensured 
awareness 
Informed the 
strategy of 
requirements 
Was non-
existent 
Ploy, as it 
changed 
according to 
the flow 
Used 
information 
Security 
Professional 
attitude 
towards 
strategy 
Organizatio
n Centric 
Information 
Security 
Strategy was 
not really 
developed, it 
may result as 
an after action 
or gap analysis 
Provided an 
understanding of 
security and 
follows ISP 
guidance 
Met the 
Information 
Security 
Professionals 
requirements 
for strategy 
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Each type of strategy set a vision, defined the mission and asserted the activities 
necessary for the implementation of strategy (Anderson & Choobinah, 2008; Cohen & Cyert, 
1973; Kankankalli, et al., 2003; Kotulic & Clark, 2004; Mintzberg & Waters, 1987).  A majority 
of literature identified the need for alignment, but most of the focus was on information systems 
alignment to business strategy.  Very little literature existed to cover information security 
strategy aligning to either business or information systems (Newkirk, et al., 2008; Rudd, 
Greenley, Beatson, & Lings, 2008; Thompson & James, 2001).   
The information security strategy supported information systems and the business 
strategy to secure the information of the business (Alter, 2008; Chen, et al., 2010; Stanton, et al., 
2003).  Protecting information and information systems at all levels becomes complex and 
diverse (Leidner, et al., 2011).  Part of the process of meshing information and information 
systems together was identified within the difficulties of aligning strategies (Doherty & Fulford, 
2006; Segars & Grover, 1998).  An area, researchers have studied was the integration of 
information security strategy to business strategy (Newkirk, et al., 2008; Tejay 2008) and the 
information security strategy to information systems (Dutta & McCrohan, 2002; Straub & 
Welke, 1998).  
One of the alignments of the information systems strategy was that of information 
systems strategy aligning completely with the business strategy through automation of data 
process, input, storage, and output (Chen, et al., 2010; Stanton, et al., 2003).  Another 
information security strategy was discussed as that of aligning to the business strategy by 
transparently passing through the information systems strategy.  This information system 
alignment was concerned only with automating the business strategy (Chen, et al., 2010).  A 
further case was one in which the information security strategy supported only one of the 
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strategies, such as the business or information systems strategies, this aligned only with that 
specific strategy, ignoring the other strategy (Caralli, 2004; Hall, et al., 2010; McFadzean, et al., 
2011).  The last type of strategy, called a non-existent strategy, had the information security 
program operating entirely on its own with no form or distinct process.  However in reality, the 
aspect of no strategy would quickly evolve into adopting the business strategy, since information 
security operates within an organization and its existing structure.   
Table 2, Alignments with Information Security Strategy, summarized the five alignment 
concepts of strategy and how they relate to definition, the assumption of information security 
strategy development, the impact of the desired information security strategy assumption, and the 
outcomes when assessed with the overall business strategy.  The following sections briefly detail 
the concepts of alignment through strategy types. 
2.3.1 Align to Business Strategy 
Aligns to business strategy has the information security strategy aligned to the business 
strategy (Caralli, 2004).  This identified the first concept of how alignment of the strategy was 
performed within an organization (Siponen, 2005b; Westerman, 2009).  The information security 
strategy was written to follow or augment the requirements of the business strategy (Cerpa & 
Verner, 1999; Hall, et al., 2010; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et al., 2011; Parkin & van 
Moorsel, 2009).  Communicating information security in business terms, while maintaining the 
security of the organization helped align the two strategies (von Solms & von Solms , 2004; von 
Solms & von Solms, 2005).  The challenge was in explaining the information security strategy in 
understandable language for the business executive to comprehend information security 
(Lindström & Hägerfors, 2009).  The information security strategy followed and worked with the 
overall goals of the organization; drawing from the requirements set forth from the 
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organization’s leadership (Hall, et al., 2010; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010).  Alignment to the 
business strategy also resulted in ensuring the accomplishments of the same, by meeting the 
goals of the strategy (Amaio, 2009; Lomprey, 2008). 
2.3.2 Align to Information Systems Strategy    
The information security strategy used the information systems strategy as a guide.  As 
an overall objective, the information security strategy was developed in tandem with and aligned 
to the information systems strategy.  While the information systems strategy was often 
information systems centric, the information security strategy attempted to ensure the secure 
attainment of goals of the information systems strategy.  The goals of information systems 
helped to ensure information tools were readily available, but sometimes may not align with 
business needs, thus not providing the organization with optimum value (Alter, 2008: Chen, et 
al., 2010; Stanton, et al., 2003). 
2.3.3 Aligns to Information Systems and Business Strategies    
Information security strategy as the shared view of the information security program 
goals in an organization aligned with both the information systems and business strategies.  
Operating in the most proficient manner, to identify business opportunities and align them, along 
with the most opportune automation techniques providing increased productivity and savings in 
equipment costs by optimizing efficiencies between the information systems strategy and the 
business strategy (Baptista, Newell, & Currie, 2010; Leidner, et al., 2011; Straub & Welke, 
1998).   
2.3.4 Information Security Strategy Operates on its Own     
Alignment four covered the domain in which the information security strategy developed 
almost in a vacuum and did not consider the business or information system strategies for 
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development (Badr, Biennier, & Tata, 2010).   For its focus, development occurred within its 
own realm and might depend upon consideration of only federal law and regulation to specify 
what the goals and objectives would be, regardless of the constraints of business and information 
system requirements.  Rather the information security strategy tended to be authoritative in 
dictating what the requirements for compliance would be from the information system and 
business strategy viewpoint (Eloff & von Solms, 2000; von Solms & von Solms, 2004). 
 2.3.5 Information Security Strategy is Non-Existent     
Alignment five considered the lack of any organized strategy from the external sources of 
business or information systems (Pfeffer, 1992).  The information security strategy existed in the 
form of interactions through an information security executive working on a day to day basis 
(Mintzberg, 1987b; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Porter, 1996; Reich & Benbasat, 2000) without 
any structured method in place.  The executive provided direction, but without formalizing the 
information security strategy in writing or other channels of communication to subordinates or 
peers.  Strategy resulted from periodic changes in direction of the senior executive on a continual 
basis.  Allen (2005) and Leidner, Lo, and Preston (2011) assert that security cannot be missing, it 
must be represented. 
2.3.6 Summary of the Alignments    
Table 2, Alignments with Information Security Strategy, summarized and listed the 
characteristics of all the alignments, listed as concepts, showing where they intersected as 
distinct types of strategies.  The author adapted the style of the table from the work by Chen, 
Mocker, Preston, & Teubner (2010) into an information security strategy related structure.  The 
discussion of the alignments presented covered the most probable ways in which an information 
security strategy could be developed; considering strategies which used business, information 
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systems or both types of strategy to accomplish a mutual set of goals.  In addition, another 
alignment consisted of preparing a strategy running on its own to serve internal needs, but failed 
to encompass overall organizational goals.  If in the case of a new organization, not having a 
strategy might comprise the only situation where it was advisable to have no strategy; but, 
having none usually resulted in a very short sighted execution of duties and resulted in much re-
work and duplication of effort (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2007).  The next section consists of 
discussing the external influences upon the information security strategy, through the roles an 
information security professional could exert over the information security strategy. 
2.4 Proposing Role Recognition for an Information Security Strategy 
Previous studies in information systems (Chen, et al., 2010) recognized three roles of 
strategy performance (Information Systems Innovator, Information Systems Conservative, and 
Information Systems Undefined), but opted not to explore other variables of roles in which to 
perform the strategies.  Leidner, Lo, and Preston (2011), built upon the original article by 
including an additional role.  They have suggested the addition of Information Systems 
Ambidextrous (Leidner, et al., 2011), which attempted to capture additional variance of the three 
roles.  The necessary next step was to build upon the previous two studies by adding a workable 
theory to test.  To that end, a grounded theory approach might grant the emergence of a theory to 
test (Pandit, 1996).  In both works, the authors opted to keep the study in the theoretical realm 
without conducting actual research into the validity of their propositions (Chen, et al., 2010; 
Leidner, et al., 2011).  Rather, they presented propositions that could lead to an intellectual basis 
for discussion of information systems strategy to contribute to the field of information systems.  
Since the actual study did not gather rigorous evidence, this study gained extensive data from 
information security professionals and used a rigorous analysis reaching saturation under 
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theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2011; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011).  
This study used the existing study (Chen, et al., 2010) to spur the validity of information security 
strategy in qualified strategic role selection by information security professionals. 
Studies identified the formal and informal interactions between business executives and 
information systems executives and that those interactions had an impact on how information 
systems implementation occurred (Pyburn, 1983; Johnson, 2009).  Often the interactions were 
rare, occurring sporadically during appraisals or when meeting to discuss strategy formation 
(Johnson, 2009).  Since the interactions were infrequent and that information systems were 
viewed as coming into alignment with business goals, the qualified strategic roles proposed by 
business might not always be coordinated with information systems.  It was assumed information 
systems follow business blindly (Pyburn, 1983).  However, interactions do need to be 
coordinated and communicated to yield an effective strategy.  
With the definition of an information security strategy established as the implementation 
of an information security strategy, it consisted of choices contributing to “an overall plan for 
managing and developing an organization’s information security,” (Baskerville & Dhillon, 
2007).  Baskerville & Dhillon (2008) recognized a good information security strategy drove 
information security policies that information security management used to implement 
information security processes and practices.  They asserted that an integrated strategy for 
information security management was necessary to achieve organizational objectives.  
Participants in securing information must clearly define their roles and responsibilities to achieve 
objectives. 
The implementation roles utilized by information security professionals varied by just as 
many backgrounds as the individuals who implemented the information security strategy 
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(Ashenden, 2012; von Solms, 2001).   The intricate interplay of an information security 
professional with business and information security executives is puzzling (Johnson, 2009).  Part 
of the puzzle was having information security management weigh their appropriate human 
interactions (Ashenden, 2012), the preferences of the leader and selection of the category to 
envelop their performance of the information security strategy under the information security 
program.  As a part of this equation, the qualified strategic roles information security 
professionals chose from consisted of a set of broad categories identified in Table 3, Qualified 
Strategic Roles of Information Security.  These broad categories of qualified strategic roles for 
implementing the information security strategy are identified as top down, public image, 
competitor, continual change, best practices, re-organization, power relationships, and 
compliance.  In Table 3, a summation of the major roles information security professionals’ 
exhibit for implementing information security strategies are listed and briefly covered.  The 
following paragraphs give a more detailed review of the eight identified qualified strategic roles. 
2.4.1 Top down    
The positioning school of thought looks at strategy performance as a reasoned top down 
approach, where executives moved and shifted strategy performance to take advantage of 
positions as the leader sees the direction change (Slaughter, Levine, Ramesh, & Pries-Heje, 
2006).  The top down role managed from top to bottom, the executives became involved with 
decisions and captured their vision in the strategy and policy, governing the actions of all 
personnel within an organization (Baskerville & Dhillon, 2008; Clark & Sitko, 2008; Dawson, et 
al., 2010; Kajava & Siponen, 1996; Lederer & Mendelow, 1988; Salmela & Spil, 2002).  The 
authority for decisions resided with the upper echelon and they directed the actions of all.  In this 
manner a select few made decisions for the greater good and it tied directly back to operations of  
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Table 3. Qualified Strategic Roles of Information Security 
Qualified 
Strategic Role 
Definition Information Systems Source Information Security Source 
Top Down The strategy as a shell and have the insides declared by 
outlining the goals, adding objectives and priorities over 
time, allowing the strategy to develop inside of defined 
boundaries.   
 Clark & Sitko, 2008; Jones, 
2001; Kajava & Siponen, 
1996 
Public Image Public image, the image was to contend for the public’s 
opinion as a means by which security was not necessarily 
observed, but perceived as implemented.  Security became 
an external façade, willing to pay fines than ensure security. 
 Anderson & Moore, 2006; 
Knapp & Boulton, 2006 
Competitor The competitor or benchmark worked to achieve the best 
condition.  Competition could be like an arms race to devise 
strategies to outwit opponents.  Innovation or 
countermeasures produced to outperform each other 
resulting in competition amongst the players.   
Howard & Kilmartin, 2006; 
Lacity & Hirscheim, 1995 
Damianides, 2005; Ohki, 
et.al., 2006 
 
Continual 
Change 
  
Strategy adapted to continuous and unpredictable change.  
Information Security adjusted as threat actor intentions and 
malware deployments changed.  Strategy moved from a once 
a year or longer cyclical repetition into an almost daily 
operational change environment.   
Bechtold, 1997; Fairholm, 
& Card, 2009; Huebler, 
Foster, & Phelps, 2007; 
Lacey, 2009; Levy, 1994; 
Valle, 2000; Yarger, 2006 
Collins, 2001 
Best Practice The best business practices (BBP) attempted to 
institutionalize and accept best practices across the 
organization.  Use of methods such as an information 
security capability maturity model, to find best practices. 
Keen & El Sawy, 2010; 
Luftman & Kempaiah, 
2008; von Solms, 2006 
Kark, Penn, & Dill, 2009; 
Kark, 2010; Kayworth & 
Whitten, 2010; Luftman & 
Ben-Zvi, 2010; Luftman & 
Ben-Zvi, 2011; McClean & 
Kark, 2010 
Re-
organization 
Used the excuse for organizational change as an argument, 
that since security had deficiencies in the past, management 
required a change in the structure of the organization; hoping 
to stave off negative reactions, the organization re-organized. 
This used the ISS to encourage organizational change.   
 Aivazian, 1998; Norman & 
Yasin, 2010; Zhang, et. al., 
2010 
Power 
Relationship 
Power exerted through the strategy, establishing 
organizational direction.  Individuals used strategy to 
exercise will and or drive conformance by employees. Power 
was wielded in two ways, effectively to advance 
organizational goals and to coerce individuals and 
organizations to achieve a short term objective, but usually 
resulted in security being ineffective over time. 
Dhillon, 2004; Dhillon, 
Caldeira, & Wenger, 2011; 
Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Minztberg, 1985;  
Lapke, 2008 
Compliance Compliance used federal laws to center the information 
security strategy around.  Compliance was very procedurally 
oriented.  People were not heavily involved with the process, 
except to perform procedures, within the process.   
 Damianides, 2005; De 
Paula, et al., 2005; Gilbert, 
2008; Hedström, 
Kolkowska, Karlsson, & 
Allen, 2011; Hu, Hart, & 
Cooke, 2007; McFadzean, et 
al., 2011; Siponen, 2005b; 
Siponen, 2006; 
Smedinghoff, 2005; von 
Solms, 1998a; von Solms, 
1998b; 
 
the organization and conformed to regulatory guidance.  Personnel often perceived this as an 
umbrella form of strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1987).  The overall direction was established by 
management, the details were worked out as goals and objectives, added over time and as 
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management revealed direction to fan out amongst the ribs of the umbrella (Jones, 2001; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1987).   
2.4.2 Public Image    
There was a perception that information security was required to protect users and assets 
from various threats in the Internet directed towards the users (Huang, Rau & Salvendy, 2010).  
The public image sought to display an image to the public of the organization as a secure 
environment for information security.  This was another role of an information security 
professional to implement an information security strategy.  The image contended for the 
public’s opinion as a means by which security was not necessarily observed, but perceived to be 
implemented, to the extent necessary to make an observer believe the organization was secure 
and trusted (Knapp & Boulton, 2006).  Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) asserted that 
organizational strategy focused on form, but not substance.  Part of the public image role was 
projecting the stability of security, ensuring the customer and the organization as a whole has 
confidence in the security of information entrusted to them (Johnson, 2009).  Security became an 
external façade, superficial in nature, which projected the image of security protecting the public 
from actual security breaches (Baskerville, 1993).  The organization asserted the existence of 
security, yet when they suffered loss, the organization opted to just pay the fines assessed, rather 
than invest sufficient funds to implement proper security measures. The cost of the fine was 
lower than the cost of proper implementation of security controls (Anderson & Moore, 2006). 
2.4.3 Competitor    
The competitor role consisted of benchmarking or competition resulted in striving for top 
position amongst organizations trying to achieve best condition.  Each unit competed, trying to 
outperform the other in providing security (Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  Remaining secure was 
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compared to an arms race to devise strategies that outwit opponents (Chang & Ho, 2006; 
Robson, 2005).   Each competitor created innovation or countermeasures to the innovation 
produced by other competitors.  Illustrative of this was the ‘Red Queen’ effect explained by 
Robson (2005) and was the result of competitors competing against one another.  Strategy strove 
to maximize profits (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  
Information security strategy looked to devise goals to keep out malware (Chan & Reich, 2007: 
Chang & Ho, 2006; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, Lampel, 1998; Tejay, 2008; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  
By adapting the ‘Red Queen’ effect, security became the objective and industry benefits when all 
the parties attempt to eliminate all information security threats.  Information security served to 
spur more profits with proper implementation as competition drives down costs and ends up 
preventing loss due to data breaches (Baskerville, 1993; Ohki, et al., 2009; Robson, 2005).  
2.4.4 Continual Change.   
One thought leader in the information systems technical and strategic areas predicted the 
rise of chaos or continual change as the new normal within information technology (Costello, 
2011).  Costello (2011), stated information technology leaders and by extension information 
security must prepare for rapid device, application, and services deployment.  This continual 
change portended that the current un-predictableness of an organization’s environment required 
continuous changes in strategy to adapt to ever changing needs (Siponen & Iivari, 2006).  For 
business, information systems and information security strategy, they all needed to react to the 
changing requirements of customers, information system assets and information handling.  
Continual change became hard, especially when commensurate information security change is 
required (Slater, 2002) and as threat actor intentions and malware deployment changed rapidly 
(Choo, 2011).  Strategy would need to move from a long cyclical period of time into a much 
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shorter operational change environment.  The continual change theory of strategy involved 
nonlinear changes and accepting feedback that may cause program redirection, by either sudden 
changes (bifurcation points) or more gradual evolution (Bechtold, 1997). 
Continual change worked along a continuum, ranging between deliberate and emergent 
strategy, but not at either of the extremes (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985).  One form of continual 
change was that of adhocracy, where an organization worked in an environment that was both 
complex and dynamic (Leidner, et al., 2011).  The environment was always unique and changing 
(Leidner, et al., 2011; Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985).  Uniqueness was delineated in five areas, 
first it was dynamic and complex with each output being unique.  Second, different outputs 
caused a need for experts to be resident.  Third, experts were housed in teams, to address issues 
as they arose.  Fourth, mutual adjustment of strategy was coordinated through working groups 
and committees.  Lastly, organizations were decentralized, and power was distributed to task 
accomplishment by experts within teams (Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985).  Overall, the role of 
continual change was one of dynamic and complex changes occurring continually. 
2.4.5 Best Practice    
The best business practices (BBP) attempted to ensure BBP institutionalization and 
acceptance across the organization as a strategic role.  The organization executed established 
policy to obtain the best results when addressing security issues (Dawson, et al., 2010).  One of 
the methods information security personnel advanced was best practices in the form of a model 
or method to mitigate risk in a repeatable fashion (Shariati, Bahmani, & Shams, 2010).   
Rezakhani, Hajebi, and Mohammadi (2011) advanced standardization as a method of best 
practices.  They sought standardization across the industry and cited instances of standard 
acceptance through programs such as Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), 
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Information Security Management System (ISMS), Information Security Maturity Management 
Model (ISM3), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International 
Engineering Consortium (IEC) (Rezakhani, Hajebi, & Mohammadi, 2011).  Use of methods such 
as checklists, capability maturity models and other practices abound in best practices 
environments (Baskerville, 1993; Shariati, Bahmani, & Shams, 2010; von Solms & von Solms, 
2005; Zuccato, 2007).  The highest level of a capability maturity model demonstrated the 
pinnacle of the best practices model, corresponding to the fifth level of a capabilities maturity 
model (Ahuja, 2009; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2010; Xiao-yan, Yu-qing, 
& Li-lei, 2011). 
End user expectations of best practices could be summarized as protecting a customer’s 
data confidentiality, ensuring accuracy of the data (Johnson, 2009).  Implemented best practices 
could be used to increase trust between partners and meet requirements levied by partners 
(Johnson, 2009), in the case of the government, public trust.  Costs must also be considered as 
there was a tradeoff between being really secure and insecurely achieving BBP, yet avoiding 
extravagant spending on security.  Lastly, best practices met the overall strategic plan for 
business objectives by providing short and long range returns on investment (Johnson, 2009). 
2.4.6 Re-Organization    
With the use of the excuse for organizational change as an argument, the re-organizer 
operated under the premise that since security had been found deficient in the past, management 
required a change in the reporting structure of the organization; hoping to stave off negative 
reactions or placate audit findings, the organization re-organized (Cecere, 2011).  Several areas 
are stated as complicit with failure, amongst them was the strategy (Rose, 2011).  A major 
problem with using the information security strategy as a tool to drive organizational and 
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structural change (Aivazian, 1998) was that management might try to use the information 
security strategy as a vehicle to encourage organizational change (Aivazian, 1998; Kotulic & 
Clark, 2004).  Some offices in an organization may justify that they did not have enough workers 
to meet inspection findings.  A recommendation to re-assign people around the organization 
helped to re-distribute and theoretically improve the information security strategy performance.  
The organizational chart was the primary artifact used with the information security strategy to 
communicate the structure and mission of the information security strategy (Norman & Yasin, 
2010). 
A positive use of re-organization, could be seen in things such as resource availability 
and could be redistributed to ensure competent information security personnel, software and 
hardware, and adequate information security budget was disbursed to appropriate parts of the 
organization (Johnson, 2009).  Another positive use might be that non-effective initial review by 
management required a change to re-direct assets towards the goal of secure information 
technology (Emery, 1991). 
2.4.7 Power Relationships    
Power could be exerted through the strategy, directing the way in which an organization 
moved forward (Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006).  Individuals used the information security 
strategy to exercise will and or drive conformance by employees, as a way in which the 
information security strategy could be wielded as an instrument of power within the organization 
(Mintzberg, 1985; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).  Wielding power to achieve information security 
goals was perceived to increase the stature of security overall.  Using power to coerce individuals 
and organizations might achieve a short term objective, but usually resulted in security being 
ineffective over time (Backhouse, et al., 2006; Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon, 2004; Dhillon, Caldeira, 
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& Wenger, 2011).  Power and accountability could impact the development and implementation 
of information security.  The lack of an effective information security strategy, led to ineffective 
security policy, which resulted in ineffective information security (Lapke, 2008; Loveland & 
Lobel, 2012).  Side effects from the use of power indicated that the use of power to negatively 
influence personnel did not have the desired effect of causing someone to behave correctly.  
Rather when positive reasoning was employed, users responded more positively (Herath & Rao, 
2009).  
2.4.8 Compliance    
Compliance looked at using federal laws and regulations to center the entire information 
security strategy around.  Compliance was very procedurally oriented (da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  
People were not heavily involved with the process, except to perform procedures, and record 
results within the process (Hedström, et al., 2011).  One article stated that as a result of data 
breaches, multiple acts and laws to ensure compliance were passed and enacted (Smedinghoff, 
2005).  Reactive implementation of controls is a precursor to complacency in that after the initial 
flurry of activity to comply, the organization went back to business as usual, with security not at 
the forefront (Damianides, 2005; Scully, 2011).  Another article stated that technological 
controls were fine, as long as people were not involved with the process (Hedström, et al., 2011).  
If people, policies, and culture were involved the risk to security exists (Hu, Hart, & Cooke, 
2007). 
One of the positive aspects of compliance was that compliance helped to ensure risk 
management, through minimizing risk that could occur from a data breach.  Ensuring accurate 
company data leads to informed management decisions (Hong, Chi, Chao, & Tang, 2003).  
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Compliance led to protection from external intruders, employee accidental or intentional 
damage, and to deter potential attacks (Johnson, 2009). 
2.4.9 Summary of Roles    
The literature consisted of information that led to the identification of eight possible 
categories of roles an information security professional could assume.  This chapter captured and 
discussed the possible roles that could be taken from extant literature.  Exploration of the role 
selection process and possible alignment inside an organization was part of a possible 
information security strategy development process (von Solms, 2001).  The next chapter 
explored in detail the research method selected to rigorously collect data and analyze it to 
theorize over role selection in accomplishing the mission of the information security program.  
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Chapter 3 
Research Method 
3.1 Introduction 
Of the different research methods available, quantitative, mixed methods, and qualitative, 
this study will use a qualitative method.  The reasoning behind non selection of the quantitative 
method is the dearth of literature on information security strategy and measuring against known 
models.  The reason to not choose mixed methods is the need to have measurable entities, but 
there are no established empirical norms for information security strategy.  Selection of the 
qualitative method centers on the fact that information was scarce on the subject of information 
security strategy (Lapke, 2008; Loveland & Loebel, 2012).  As such, the methods of research for 
utilizing models and theories are minimal.  Grounded theory data collection allows for the 
analysis of data; using the interpretive techniques of interviews and artifact collection of data 
(Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  Much data was collected and conceptually analyzed to 
understand organizational use of the role of information security strategy through a grounded 
theory approach by using theoretical sampling techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Javinen, 
2000; Lee & Hubona, 2009; Pauleen, Corbitt, & Yoong, 2007; Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009; 
Yoong, 1996).  Extensive collection, analysis, and comparison of the data ensured rigor (Lee & 
Hubona, 2009).   
Grounded theory works inductively, by collection of artifacts and interviews, then 
working through stages of coding to develop an emergent theory (Pandit, 1996).  The steps begin 
with interviews and transcription; coding of the interviews using open, axial, and selective 
coding techniques; and then developing the theory (Allan, 2003; Jones & Alony, 2011; Glaser, 
2012b; LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007).  At each step capturing thought, procedure, and 
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process through memoing helped develop understanding and insights as the compilation of 
collected data occurred and analysis was conducted (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Pauleen, Corbitt, & Yoong, 2007; Rich, 2012).   
Grounded theory is very useful in instances when the area under study, such as this, does not 
have considerable research being performed and the nature of the study involved human 
experience and interaction to obtain data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Yoong, 1996).  The objective 
of the study investigated the connections between the information security strategy and the 
role(s) necessary to execute the information security program in order to meet organizational 
requirements for information security.  It could also prove helpful to information security 
professionals if the outputs from this grounded theory methodology resulted in constructing a 
formal approach to information security strategy selection that goes beyond the implementation 
of technical controls.  Additionally, it could be beneficial to forming a proactive approach to 
information security strategy, if a model could be predictive of role selection. The following 
sections: open coding, axial coding, and selective coding present more detail over the rigor 
practiced throughout the steps of the data collection process. 
3.2 Research Method 
The grounded theory methodology followed in this study allowed and encouraged 
probing for information in how an information security professional was influenced to select 
roles and make choices to perform their information security programs.  The interview 
questioning and exploration for data granted insight into how construction of an information 
security strategy took place (Duffy, Ferguson, & Watson, 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).  
Further, the analysis of the data led to an understanding whether certain types of strategy were 
preferable over others and how strategies differed from one another as perceived by executive 
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level members in an organization from business, information system, and information security 
sections (Fitzgerald, 2010; Johnson, 2009).  It also helped to ascertain how information security 
personnel differentiated between types of information security strategies.  Chapter 2 presented a 
possible way in the process of selection of a role to perform information security strategy could 
be made.  Chapter 4 covers the process of selection to reveal if there is an optimum role for a 
specific information security strategy.  The aim of this study was to derive theory from analyzed, 
collected data (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Siponen, 2005a; Vannoy & Salam, 2010), and present an 
emergent theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Glaser, 2012a; Goldkuhl & Cronholm, 2010; 
Pandit, 1996; Scott & Howell, 2008).  The data was collected from the artifacts, interviews, 
observations, and documents, and then coded and analyzed into a theory which was used to 
verify the problem statement and research questions (Huehls, 2005; Lee & Hubona, 2009; 
Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).  The emergent concepts from the coding steps were grouped into 
concepts and categories, and categories integrated to form a theory (Corbin & Strauss 2008; 
Huehls, 2005).  A theory then depicted adaptable ways of theorizing how an information security 
professional selects a role (Fitzgerald, 2010; Siponen, 2005a). 
As an initial foray into information security strategy using grounded theory, it was useful 
to discover a process for qualified strategic role selection by an organization, which would have 
a positive impact on organizational performance.  The primary contribution was a theory 
allowing an organization to evaluate its needs, select, and then possibly implement an 
information security strategy.  The first step in the process was gathering the data and the 
following section illustrates how data was collected. 
3.3 Proposed Data Collection 
The data collection process consisted of multiple steps or stages in grounded theory 
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methodology.  Figure 1, Developing a Grounded Theory, highlights the steps required to arrive 
at a theory from the collected data.  To start, the researcher conducted interviews with 
participants in the study.  After the interviews were conducted, they were transcribed and 
reviewed by the researcher, to ensure complete information was captured and transferred to print 
medium (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).  During the process of transcription, the 
researcher recorded memos, capturing the researcher’s impressions expressed by the participant, 
for use in the coding process (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Stocker & Close, 2013).  
Cycling between the interview and transcription forms the data collection portion of interviews.  
Other sources for collection are the observations of the researcher in the environment wherein 
the participant operated (Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; LaRossa, 2005).  The researcher collected 
document artifacts which ranged from strategy documents, standard operating procedures, and 
internal letters covering mission goals and objectives (Lee & Hubona, 2009), which 
complemented the data collected during the interviews with executives.  The follow-on for the 
interview was taking the information and coding it into usable data for building a theory 
(Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
With grounded theory, there are very few guidelines to establish an optimum number of 
subjects for interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989; McFadzean, et al., 2007; McFadzean, et al., 2011).  
One source recommends a minimal sampling of fifteen to twenty subjects for grounded theory, 
where prior data is almost nonexistent (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2011).  Another 
source recommends to almost double the amount for the recommended minimums, of 20 to 30 
subjects (Creswell, 2002).   Charmaz (2006), advanced that the researcher should query their 
participants and add interviews until reaching saturation, which may be a small amount of 
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Figure 1. Developing a Grounded Theory 
individuals on up to approximately 30 different participants.  Saturation occurs when, as a 
researcher, one collects and comparatively analyzes data and a point is reached when no new 
categories or areas are discovered from discussions with CISOs or gleaning data from 
documents.  The estimation being that once saturation is reached, the need for more interviews 
no longer exists (Charmaz, 2006).  The researcher for this study queried twenty five participants 
from one large government organization, and expanded this to several within the Federal 
government, interviewing seven other chief information security officers (CISOs) in order to 
reach saturation of the categories. 
The researcher reached out to the organizations and queried executive level participants 
to take part in interviews, asked for copies of documents pertaining to their strategy and their 
mission goal accomplishments, and obtained permission to observe day to day operations for a 
time within their organization (Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; LaRossa, 2005).  This study did not 
conflict with the researcher’s professional duties and complete anonymity of position and 
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location was practiced with the organizations.  Initial interviews with 13 CISOs and their 
deputies, for a total of 25 from the 13 sub units of the large organization comprised the main 
participants in the study.  An additional seven CISOs and or deputies were approached from 
other large organizations in order to reach saturation (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  
This involved four additional organizations to reach an adequate level of saturation (Charmaz, 
2006). 
The chief information security officers (CISOs) from the information security sub units 
were the primary interviewees for the grounded theory study.  Johnson (2009) asserted that the 
best mix of data comes from executives of equal rank and from peer levels in the organization.  
This allowed for viewpoints from similar background levels on information security from CISOs 
in the overall organization, but also from differing sub units (Johnson, 2009).  And, it granted the 
review of the roles they deemed necessary to meet organizational sub unit information security 
requirements.  What one level of the organization deemed necessary does not always equate to 
what the other organizations deemed necessary (Chen, et al., 2010).  Each organization had 
differing mission requirements.  The interviews gained key enabler data from top level 
management insights “(b)y exploring what managers were thinking, why they acted as they did, 
and what they wanted to accomplish within the organizational context,” (Vannoy & Salam, 
2010) for the subject of strategy and strategic roles.    
In order to gauge the length of time required at each site in the use of grounded theory, 
the researcher reviewed the number, location, and parts of the large governmental organization 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Glaser, 2002).  The main organization covered here was dubbed the 
‘Branch of the Fatherland’ which consisted of 13 smaller subunits performing differing portions 
of the mission of the overall large organization.  Of these 13 smaller sub units, a number of 
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CISOs and their deputies were selected and interviewed, observed, and documented.  A brief, 
sanitized unit organizational mission statement, collected from each of the unit sources yielded 
information about its number, location(s) and composition (Pitt, Parent, Junglas, Chan, & 
Spyropoulou, 2011), except for one sub unit who did not want information captured.  Refer to 
Table 4, Participant Sub Unit Characteristics, for a brief explanation of each sub unit. 
The most complex portion of the data collection was the actual interview of participants.  There 
are several types of interview styles to choose from such as semi-structured, structured, and open 
ended interviews (Allan, 2003; Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).  The narrowness 
of the information required and the small area of the overall information security program 
recommended the semi-structured form of interviewing as the most effective (Charmaz, 2006, 
Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Duffy, et. al., 2004).  The reason being that open ended interviews may 
end up gathering volumes of extraneous data, not pertinent to the study and structured interviews 
may tend to be overly biased (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000).  Therefore, the use 
of semi-structured interviews was selected. 
The researcher asked executive level personnel, in the information security field, from the 
sub units of a large government organization to take part.  The participants agreed to answering 
questions and were assured of confidentiality and anonymity in their responses.  In order to have 
consistent interviews with all the participants, the researcher agreed to and observed the ground 
rules for the interview utilizing an approved Institutional Review Board (IRB) consent form to 
give the participant a frame of reference and keep the interactions of the interview within a 
bounded area (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
 For each interview, the researcher wrote down notes from all the answers to the 
questions, jotting down details as they occurred.  Outlines of the discussion provided the skeleton 
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Table 4. Participant Sub Unit Characteristics 
Name* Size 
(Information 
Security 
Personnel) 
Mission Statement 
AXXX 22 Watches over Fatherland’s banking and payment 
systems to ensure integrity. Also protects national 
leaders, dignitaries, special locations, and Fatherland 
events. 
UHJY 210 Helps the public by responding, recovering, and 
remediating from all hazards. Helps the Fatherland to be 
prepared for any emergencies.  
FRT 0** Watches over the Fatherland’s transportation systems to 
make sure citizens and commerce can move freely.  
UKO 135 Enforces Fatherland’s civil and national laws for the 
border, customs, trade, and immigration.  
ERF 171 Primarily keeps invaders and supplies for invader 
groups out from the Fatherland. Ensures trade conducted 
fairly and all bureaucratic rules are obeyed. 
CFTY 240 Patrols the Fatherland’s coastal edges against unlawful 
entry and assists people who may be in danger along the 
coast. 
GHY 5 Independently validates subunits for optimum 
performance, by identifying areas of improvement and 
ways to attain compliance. 
GHJK 14 Facilitates training for law enforcement to assist them 
with skills development for public safety.  
ERFT 177 Ensures immigration procedures followed and teaches 
principles and benefits of Fatherland are communicated 
to all citizens.   
WFRT 102 Helps to ensure risk resilience throughout Fatherland in 
government and industry, by an integrated method for 
both cyber and physical threats.  
WER 39 Performs research and development for all levels of 
government used to find emerging technology to 
support and protect the Fatherland.  
NKOP 181 Responsible for Fatherland’s information technology 
systems and equipment, and the identification and 
tracking of performance measurements. 
WDC 21 Responsible for protecting information and intelligence 
from being exploited.   
*NOTE: Specific names and some aspects of their function changed to avoid disclosure. 
**NOTE: At the time of collection, FRT deemed it essential not to reveal full complement of 
information security personnel figures. 
 
of the interview notes and assisted the researcher in analyses made.  Most executives enjoyed 
having their thoughts taken down and preserved in reports, documents, and in this instance for 
the interviews (Johnson, 2009).  Ample time was set aside during the interview to allow the 
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participants to form their thought, considering their perceived factors with the information 
security strategy provided to them by management in the organization and to express their 
driving compassion for information security (Charmaz, 2006).  Notes were transcribed as soon as 
possible after the interview was conducted (Duffy, et al., 2004; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000) via 
memoing.  The researcher also wrote down an initial interpretation immediately afterwards 
(Stocker & Close, 2013).  While every effort was made to collect exhaustive data during the 
initial session, the option was kept open to conduct multiple sessions with all the participants at a 
future point in time, if necessary (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008).   
Several direct and indirect questions were asked of the interviewees to lead discussion 
during the interview.  In this way through open ended questions in a semi structured interview, it 
elicited information from the executives operating in the actual information security 
environment, as they supported the business, information systems, and information security 
missions (Allan, 2003; Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Duffy, et al., 2004).  The 
researcher planned out the questions as probing, but not aimed at any pre-selection of roles, 
alignments, or construction of a strategy.  The source for interview questions came from 
knowledge gained and based on the literature available and reviewed in Chapter 2.  The 
questions focused on discovering how the interviewee developed their role within the 
organization where they were assigned.  Also, the discussion sought to have the interviewee 
explore their reasoning for picking particular roles.  Table 5, Interview Question Rationale, listed 
the questions used, the source for the question, and the rationale for their formation of a response 
during the interview.  The nature of theoretical sampling allowed and encouraged participants to 
be free in their response and to follow no set path in revealing data about their understanding of 
the complexities of the formation of information security strategy in government organizations 
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and what the differing roles individuals used to perform information security applied to their unit 
in the organization (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  The researcher did ask clarifying questions to 
elicit further open ended responses from the participants.  During the process of data collection, 
the researcher avoided reaching conclusions with participants (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008).  The epoche or the conscious decision centered on objectivity was to remove any 
preconceived notions during an interview (Allan, 2003; Kwok, McCallin, & Dickson, 2012).  
Keeping distance from the data sources helped to prevent developing a theory closely tied to the 
data that might otherwise look more like a quantitative observation with empirical data (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989) than an impartial collection of the data evaluated using the 
grounded theory approach.  No preconceived agendas guided collection in response to the 
research questions or the research problem (Allan, 2003).  Accomplishing interviews in this 
fashion brought rigor to the collection process and ensured bias avoidance from introduction by 
the researcher (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Kwok, et al., 2012). 
Theoretical sampling allowed the researcher to obtain practitioner data directly from the 
professionals closest to the process, obtaining firsthand information more applicable to 
addressing the research problem.  Utilizing constructivist grounded theory techniques (Allen, 
2010; Charmaz, 2006; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Glaser, 2012a; Rich, 2012), the 
researcher crafted questions to elicit a story and a history of the participant without feeling under 
pressure to perform (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Wimpenny,& Gass, 2000).  The 
participant felt more comfortable in answering honestly.  Once participants yielded data in the 
interview, concepts were then derived (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Huehls, 2005).  
Theoretical sampling also enabled the researcher to discover practitioner concepts relevant to the 
problem and the population, because of the unexplored organizational areas of the information 
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Table 5. Interview Question Rationale 
Question Sources Rationale 
In your opinion, what 
is information 
security strategy? 
Baskerville & 
Dhillon, 2008; 
White & Bruton, 
2011 
Find out and elicit from the participant the level of 
understanding they have of the subject of strategy 
and especially information security strategy. 
What does security 
strategy mean to you? 
And to this 
organization? 
Hall, Sarkoni, & 
Mazzuchi, 2010 
More opinion based, to ascertain the information 
the participant operates with in the performance of 
their job and how they see themselves supporting 
the business mission through strategy. 
What is the role you 
take to accomplish 
information security 
strategy? 
Johnson, 2009; 
Johnson & 
Lederer, 2010 
Trying to get the participant to evaluate their 
perceived role of operation within the 
organization.  The most direct question to 
ascertain their perception of roles. 
Can you elaborate on 
how you arrive with 
your strategic 
priorities for 
information security? 
Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985 
Attempting to gain insight into their selection 
process and how they operate with their 
leadership’s direction for strategic development.  
The participant evaluates their activities and 
matches them to the priorities they need to 
achieve for success. 
Can you describe the 
model (framework or 
system) of your 
information security 
strategy? 
Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985 
An attempt to gain from the participant the 
viewpoint they have of the information security 
strategy and where it fits in the information 
system and organizational strategy.  The 
participant plays a role in meeting outside 
objectives. 
Can you describe how 
the implementation of 
information security 
strategy is tracked? 
McFadzean, et 
al., 2007; 
Johnson, 2009 
A question to try and find out if they have metrics 
established and how they measure success in 
completion of goals and objectives in an 
organized plan.  Assuming a role, the participant 
tracks success and keeps track of it. 
Thinking of security 
strategy, how do you 
manage the priorities 
of the large 
organization? 
Gavetti & 
Rivkin, 2005 
Does the participant track and use the strategy as a 
tool or does the plan not work correctly as written.  
This also illustrates the role the participant takes 
to be able to accomplish the priorities. 
Can you explain what 
capabilities are 
necessary for a 
successful 
information security 
strategy? 
McFadzean, et 
al., 2007; 
McFadzean, et 
al., 2011 
To try and ascertain what the participant views as 
being successful with an information security 
strategy.  How they approach the strategy and 
what role they may assume to make it successful. 
Note: Some sources are from business and information systems strategy research, as the guiding principles apply 
also to information security strategy. 
 
security program that became important to this study (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; 
Creswell, 2002; Jirasek, 2012; Mcfadzean, et al., 2007).   
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Data collection led to analysis.  Analysis led to concepts.  Concepts generated questions.  
Questions led to more data collection.  As analysis ensued, it kept revealing concepts and if 
questions persisted, the researcher made arrangements to gain further clarification from the 
participants (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Huehls, 2005).  The cycle of more collection continued 
until all possible data collection and coding for new concepts yielded no new concepts from the 
analysis.  Continuous data collection happened with participants until reaching saturation.  
Saturation occurs until the point, “when no new categories or relevant themes are emerging,” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008).  At that point, data collection was completed.  In the  following data 
analysis section, the process for performing open, axial, and selective coding is covered to 
construct categories on multiple levels and develop the theory from the data (Allan, 2003; 
Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss 2008; Jones & Alony, 2011; LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et 
al., 2007). 
3.4 Proposed Data Analysis 
Data analysis was where coding took place.  Grounded theory uses the comparative 
method of data analysis, analyzing elements of the data within and from one source to another 
(Allan, 2003; Jones & Alony, 2011, Rich, 2012).  The process starts with collecting data from 
individual interviews and artifacts and then constantly comparing and contrasting data between 
collected interviews and artifacts.   The outcomes of these comparisons should identify 
categories and the core category through this coding process identified in Figure 1, Developing a 
Grounded Theory (Allan, 2003; Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; Hallberg, 2006; LaRossa, 2005; 
Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  The coding process consisted of three separate, yet interrelated steps in 
data analysis.  Figure 1, depicts the first step as open coding which builds multiple categories and 
as a result of analysis in the open coding step a central or core category began to emerge 
46 
 
(Hallberg, 2006).  The second step, axial coding, establishes connections between categories that 
are identified and built into the structure of the analysis.  The third step, selective coding, 
developed the outputs of axial coding and weaves them together to build the narrative of the 
analysis (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Jones & Alony, 2011; Siponen, 2005a).   
Overall, comparative analysis was inductive and led to building a theory from the data 
(Allan, 2003; Devades, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Rowlands, 2005).  To assuage the notion of 
skepticism over the use of grounded theory, strict methods were followed that granted 
repeatability, should someone desire to take the information collected and attempt to re-create 
the same categories or arrive with the same theory.  Opening the sources and identifying this 
method adds rigor to ensure obtaining similar results.  The researcher also used two tools adapted 
from other grounded theory exemplars, called the conditional relationship guide and reflective 
coding matrix (Scott & Howell, 2008).  The conditional relationship guide introduced a step by 
step procedure to obtain and verify the dissection of collected data into high level categories.  
The reflective coding matrix adds rigor by the way in which it aids the researcher to collect and 
comparatively analyze similarities together during axial and selective coding, assisting with 
identifying the properties of what will become the emergent theory (Scott & Howell, 2008). 
The first step of the open coding process worked to identify the concepts, categories and 
properties, captured in interviews, memos and code notes.  During open coding, analysis can be 
as granular as analyzing word for word, a line at a time, two to three sentences or whole 
paragraphs to surmise meaning into categories (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; LaRossa, 2005; Vannoy 
& Salam, 2010).  Open coding gathered the data, built the background, and focused on the words 
chosen and used.  Open coding also looked at how comparisons were made with the discovered 
categories and how similar categories were placed into groupings (Allan, 2003; LaRossa, 2005; 
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McFadzean, et al., 2007).  The conditional relationship guide is a simple matrix that assists with 
establishing and capturing initial categories for use in open coding.  The matrix assisted by 
expanding researcher experience and interpretive creativity through asking several questions of 
the data to allow the development of categories (Scott & Howell, 2008).  The consistent use of 
the questions to establish categories added to the rigor in the treatment of data and ensured 
identification of all possible categories.  Scott and Howell (2008) suggested the use of the matrix 
to add rigor as it established an audit trail in how categories were developed, using the interview 
questions.  After grouping together terms into categories, the next step built the linkages or 
connections between the categories. 
Axial coding sought to find the relationships or links between categories.  Axial coding 
analysis considered interconnections of categories and if terms or phrases should be moved 
around or placed in different categories.  During the second step, the areas of interest were built 
through the connecting of narratives together.  Axial coding looked for causal conditions and if 
any intervening connections occurred between the categories, for building of stories amongst the 
categories (LaRossa, 2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  The primary 
purpose of the reflective coding matrix was to develop the core category and contextualize it 
with all the other minor categories identified from the collected data (Hallberg, 2006; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998).  Scott and Howell (2008) observed that the reflective coding matrix helped to 
build the categories into an evolving storyline, refining the order and sequence of categories.  
The researcher used the reflective coding matrix to flow from left to right, moving categories 
around and kept the story flowing from start to finish, which all centered around the core 
category or central phenomenon (Brown, Stevens, Troiano, & Schneider, 2002; Hallberg, 2006).  
The end result of using both the conditional relationship guide and the reflective coding matrix 
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led to the theory development and emergence from the data (Brown, et al., 2002).  The reflective 
coding matrix feeds selective coding.   
Selective coding was the combining together of all the plots into a more coherent 
outcome from all the analysis of information.  The story behind all the data collected during 
interviews and from artifacts retrieved and analyzed from files (Jones & Alony, 2011; LaRossa, 
2005; McFadzean, et al., 2007; Vannoy & Salam, 2010).  This third step, selective coding, was 
where the data analysis of threading the categories into the core category together to define how 
things resolved into an emergent theory (Hallberg, 2006).  The last part of the selective coding 
step revealed the relationships amongst the data to show the theory from the collected data 
(Backman & Kyngaes, 1999; Devadas, Silong, & Ismail, 2011; Siponen, 2005b).   With the 
successful coding of data, the results of open, axial, and selective coding are reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
Data Collection, Analysis, and Findings 
4.1 Introduction  
Outcomes for this study developed as the collection, analysis, and results stages 
progressed.  The researcher interviewed participants, dissected the inputs of the interviews and 
correlated the results into a theory on the roles individuals used for an information security 
strategy.  The following sections elucidate the steps taken and tied them together to produce a 
theory to advance the information security program through the analysis of information security 
strategy. 
4.2 Data Collection 
Using the procedure for conducting interviews as prescribed in Chapter 3, the researcher 
conducted interviews with 32 chief information security officers (CISOs) and their deputies 
(DCISOs).  Primarily, 25 interviews were conducted from units within one large government 
organization.  An additional seven interviews were conducted with CISOs and DCISOs from like 
or sister units within other large government organizations.  Table 6, Sister Unit Characteristics, 
identifies the sister or similar organizations and how they would equate to CISOs and DCISOs 
from the large ‘Fatherland’ organization (Table 4, Participant Sub Unit Characteristics).  Table 6 
contains a short sanitized mission statement of the sister units and then a cross reference to Table 
4 to illustrate where the units are similar.  The seven interviews served two purposes.  Primarily, 
to reach saturation in the collection of data, but also to test and observe whether like or sister 
organizations responded with the same kinds of responses.  The seven respondents did answer 
the questions in a very similar manner.  Table 7, Interviewee Index, captured a breakdown of all 
of the study participants.  It shows the respondent identifier to the unit type and whether the 
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organization was small or large; also, whether the participant was from sister organizations or 
not.  Small organizations are sub parts of a large organization. 
Each interview was carried out per the arrangements identified within the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approved agreement.  The researcher met with each individual at a local 
coffee shop, meeting room, or an agreed upon CISO designated meeting location.  The 
interviewer reviewed the entire IRB agreement paragraph by paragraph with each interviewee 
Table 6. Sister Unit Characteristics 
Sister Unit 
Name 
Name from Table 4, 
Participant Sub Unit 
Characteristics 
Mission Statement 
LLA  UHJY Helps the public by responding, recovering, and 
remediating from all chemical and bio hazards. Helps 
the country to be prepared for those emergencies.  
MSD  FRT Watches over the country’s high energy systems to 
make sure citizens of the country are safe.  
BAUD*  ERF Primarily keeps terrorists and supplies for terrorist 
groups out from the country. Ensures order and 
civility in the country and all bureaucratic rules are 
obeyed. 
VTEB  WER Performs research and development for all levels of 
government used to find emerging drugs to support 
and protect the country.  
POKE  NKOP Responsible for country’s information technology 
systems and equipment, and the identification and 
tracking of performance measurements. 
ABC  WDC Responsible for protecting information and intelligence 
from being exploited in the country.   
*NOTE: The agency BAUD had two participants from the same organization 
and obtained a commitment to be available for follow-on questioning, if necessary.  The 
interviewer asked the same set of questions, in the same way, from each individual to ensure 
appropriate rigor (Allan, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Lee & Hubona, 2009).  The interviewer 
wrote the text of the responses verbatim and took observational notes during each session.  
Immediately afterwards, the interviewer transcribed the notes into a capture of the interview.  
The interviewer also kept a journal of interviewees after conducting the interview of each 
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participant.  Each respondent was assigned an arbitrary, random alpha numeric designator, as 
noted in Table 7, Interviewee Index, and the resultant transcript of the interviews were used in 
the coding analysis. 
Table 7. Interviewee Index 
 
The researcher conducted the interviews over a six month period of time.  The bulk of the 
interviews took place within the first three months (December 2013 to February 2014), as the 
availability of CISOs was optimal.  For the second three months (March to May 2014), schedules 
and availability of CISOs prevented a few interviews from taking place as planned.  Inclement 
weather did play a role with two interview attempts and obtaining those interviews stretched over 
two months before resolving schedule conflicts and the actual interview taking place.  The 
researcher persisted in obtaining interviews and reached saturation before the thirty second 
interview.  It would not be possible to say exactly when saturation was reached, because of the 
comparative analysis process occurred alongside conducting interviews.  As stated in Chapter 3, 
the point of saturation was reached when no new data for categories surfaced during the 
interviews of CISOs.   
It should be noted, that during the entire interview process two invited CISOs were not 
able to participate.  One CISO had intervening reasons for not conducting an interview, by 
continually stating information security issues and other meetings took priority over an 
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interview.  A second CISO, who initially agreed to be interviewed, had been extremely difficult 
to contact and has been traveling constantly around the United States since their arrival.  After 
May 2014, the point of saturation was reached.  Two additional new CISOs have been hired into 
units within the large organization, but lack expertise in the field and in the large ‘Fatherland’ 
organization precluded the need to interview the CISOs.  In the end, saturation was reached 
through the 32 contacted and participated CISOs and no further interviews have been deemed 
necessary.  However should the opportunity arise, the researcher does remain open and 
invitations have been extended to CISOs who would still like to participate.   
4.3 Data Analysis 
The researcher began the analysis of data by taking the whole interviews of the 
participants and summarized them individually into a high level analysis overview.  The initial 
results captured in Table 8, Overall Initial Analysis, illustrated where each CISO stood in the 
general areas under the study.  The initial analysis considered four specific areas of interest.  
Proactive versus reactive approach; whether they have a written strategy or not, who they aligned 
with, and what their perceived role might be.  All this information was captured in the individual 
highlighted sections of Table 8, Overall Initial Analysis.  The first area was whether the CISO 
viewed their information security program as operating with a reactive, proactive, or a 
combination of both a reactive or proactive approach towards their information security program.  
One specific instance can be related, according to Respondent M7 (personal communication, 
April 14, 2014) who stated, “it (information security strategy) needs to clearly articulate the risk 
of a decision by management that would put data at risk and it must be proactive and not reactive 
in decisions.”  The second area asked was whether the CISO had an information security strategy 
of some sort, did not have one, or stated that one was not necessary.  One indicative example of  
53 
 
Table 8. Overall Initial Analysis 
S
tr
at
eg
y
  
P
ro
ac
ti
v
e 
R
ea
ct
iv
e 
H
av
e 
o
n
e 
D
o
n
't
 h
av
e 
o
n
e 
N
o
t 
N
ee
d
ed
 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
B
u
s/
IT
 
IT
 
O
n
 i
ts
 o
w
n
 
A
d
-h
o
c 
T
o
p
 D
o
w
n
 
P
u
b
li
c 
Im
ag
e 
C
o
m
p
et
it
o
r 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
al
 C
h
an
g
e 
B
es
t 
P
ra
ct
ic
e 
R
e-
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
P
o
w
er
 R
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 
C
o
m
p
li
an
ce
 
Respondent                                     
A0 X     X     X       X       X       
B3   X   X       X                   X 
B8 X X   X         X X X     X X       
C7   X   X     X         X           X 
D2   X             X         X       X 
E3   X X       X   X         X         
F5 X X     X   X     X X     X       X 
G7   X X X       X   X X             X 
H8   X   X       X             X     X 
I5 X X         X   X         X X       
J7   X   X             X     X   X   X 
K2   X   X     X       X       X     X 
K5 X     X   X           X   X X       
L9 X               X         X X       
M2 X   X       X       X     X X       
M7   X X       X     X X             X 
N5 X X   X     X     X X     X       X 
O9   X   X         X   X   X         X 
P4 X     X         X           X     X 
P5   X     X   X               X     X 
Q3   X   X     X       X       X       
R2   X   X     X               X     X 
S1   X   X     X   X   X       X     X 
T5 X     X   X     X           X     X 
T8   X   X           X X           X   
U2 X   X       X   X         X X     X 
V8 X   X       X   X     X   X X       
W3 X     X     X             X X       
X4 X X   X     X           X X       X 
X9 X     X   X     X X       X X   X   
Y4   X   X     X               X     X 
Z7   X   X         X X       X     X   
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an isolated case came from Respondent F5 (personal communication, December 30, 2013) who 
said, “What we do, is we have developed, rather we have the CIO strategic plan.”  As a 
qualitative measurement, most of the CISOs either had a written strategy, one was in the process 
of approval, or they used a higher level organizational strategy, such as the information systems 
strategy or the business strategy.  The CISOs who stated it as not being necessary relied upon 
having the information systems strategy from the Chief Information Officer (CIO) as their 
prescriptive strategy.  The third area looked at the way in which the CISO aligned their activities 
in the information security program towards one that used the goals of the business, business and 
information systems, information systems, information security operating on its own or using ad-
hoc (no goals in their leadership) working issues as they were confronted.  One example of a 
business driven strategy came from Respondent M2 (personal communication, January 8, 2014) 
who said, “My role is to act as a conduit to political appointees.  I deal with political appointees 
and the overarching drivers of the organization.”  In the fourth section of the spreadsheet, an 
initial assessment was made in how the CISOs viewed and or operated in a role for the 
performance of their duties.  Some stated they operated in one particular role and some CISOs 
displayed performance of multiple roles to meet their assessed information security program 
goals (Carter, Grover, & Bennett Thatcher, 2011; Weill & Woerner, 2013).  The roles identified 
from the participants consisted of top down, public image, competitor, continual change, best 
practice, and compliance very similar to the categories identified in Chapter 2. 
A closer look at the overall analysis revealed that for the most part CISOs viewed 
themselves as reactive in response to leadership.  Most CISOs do not have an established 
information security strategy.  The overwhelming majority worked with business and 
information systems sections of the organization.  They decried the lack of security, but 
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conformed to either the CIO or business leadership.  Lastly, most CISOs performed primarily in 
a compliance mode of operations.  The main reason surfacing in most interviews was the fact 
that by Federal law the CISOs must comply with the Clinger Cohen Act of 2002, under the 
section known as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 2002 (Burwell, 
2013; Corbet, 2014).  The initial overall analysis highlighted individual overviews of what 
individual CISOs viewed for their information security programs.  The actual analysis in this 
study used coding to bring all the inputs from all of the respondents and weave them all into an 
overall review.  Using the agreed upon approach in Chapter 3, the researcher began coding data 
from the transcribed interviews.  The researcher proceeded into the coding process to perform 
the open, axial, and selective coding of the collected data. 
4.3.1 Open Coding 
The interviewer transcribed the sentence by sentence breakdown of the interviews 
conducted with CISO executives.  There was no paraphrasing or summarization of thought in the 
transcriptions of the interviews. The researcher utilized an open coding process to review all the 
sentences collected from interviews with 32 CISO executives.  As an example of the rigor 
performed, on the interview can be illustrated in taking one particular portion, at random and 
following through open coding.  The portion selected were parts of Respondent Y4 in the first 
steps of the comparative analysis inside of the open coding process leading to categorization of 
the interview.  In particular, Respondent Y4, Question 6 is used for this analysis.  The interview 
question (Table 5, Interview Question Rationale) was, “Can you describe how the 
implementation of information security strategy is tracked?” and the response from Respondent 
Y4 was: 
Implementation is tracked through a number of ways in our program.  First it is 
measured through compliance activities taking a given standard and incorporating 
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these policies and standards into a checklist of activities of which all team 
members affiliated with these actions and tasks are responsible for.  Another way 
is through management activities in understanding the day to day mission and the 
approvals that must accompany certain activities and an effective communication 
process which allows managers to remain insightful about the activities of their 
stuff.  Another way of tracking it is through mandatory reporting or inspections by 
the organization office of the inspector general.  I believe that all of these methods 
allows for us to successfully gauge the effectiveness of the program and provides 
key indicators as to the effectiveness of the implementation strategy.  Lastly, 
customer feedback cannot be overlooked in assessing the implementation of the 
program.  
 
The researcher used a manual form to take the captured sentences of Question 6 from  
Respondent Y4, dividing them up into a sentence for each cell in Table 9, Question 6, 
Respondent Y4.  The left hand column states the respondent’s sentence and then next to it in the 
adjacent right hand column, the initial first pass of comparative analysis towards categorization  
Table 9. Question 6, Respondent Y4 
Response Broken into Sentences Analysis of the sentence 
Implementation is tracked through a number of ways 
in our program.   
Number of ways of tracking 
First it is measured through compliance activities 
taking a given standard and incorporating these 
policies and standards into a checklist of activities of 
which all team members affiliated with these actions 
and tasks are responsible for.   
Compliance through checklists is one 
Another way is through management activities in 
understanding the day to day mission and the 
approvals that must accompany certain activities and 
an effective communication process which allows 
managers to remain insightful about the activities of 
their staff.   
Business understands mission approves staff 
working in locations 
Another way of tracking it is through mandatory 
reporting or inspections by the organization office of 
the inspector general.   
Auditing of systems to IG 
I believe that all of these methods allows for us to 
successfully gauge the effectiveness of the program 
and provides key indicators as to the effectiveness of 
the implementation strategy.   
Strategy is realized through use of compliance 
auditing and approvals 
Lastly, customer feedback cannot be overlooked in 
assessing the implementation of the program. 
Customers are key in working 
by open coding techniques.  The side by side analysis in the open coding form captured the 
transcript of CISOs on the left hand side and open coding review for categorization on the right 
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hand side.  The reviews were produced as short evaluation statements, used for identifying 
categories.  This step became the background to the comparative analysis, conducted within the 
open coding step in an ongoing basis (Corbin & Strauss 2008; Charmaz, 2006).   
The ‘in vivo’ summation in the right hand column attempted to keep the respondent’s 
own words as much as possible for the category comparative analysis.  The researcher performed 
the side by side analysis of 1,783 sentences from the 32 interviews conducted.  After the first few 
interviews conducted, the interviewer surmised that the interview questions being asked 
accomplished exactly what was desired.  The responses gained from the interviewees produced 
thoughtful exchanges between the interviewer and the CISO executives based upon the intended 
areas as identified in Chapter 3, Table 5, Interview Question Rationale. 
The researcher took the information resulting from the analysis of the sentence in the 
initial open coding comparative analysis and grouped like sentences together.  To illustrate how 
a collected respondent’s responses fit into the overall collected candidate’s grouping, the 
researcher depicted it as in Table 10, Comparative Analysis Groupings.  The table consisted of a 
column, on the left, identifying the individual Respondent Y4, Question 6, analysis of the 
sentence, from Table 9, Question 6, Respondent Y4.  These entries were added to the other 
sentences from subsequent interviews into the middle column, which showed the current total of 
collected candidates for a proposed category from all interviews conducted to that point in the 
process of data collection.  The sentences represented the ‘in vivo’ responses from the aggregate 
respondents and collected these like responses together to yield the number of times a response 
occurred.  The third column was the in process count of the number of times a like response was 
received up to the point in time.  The number merely represented whether a candidate for a 
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category was substantial by the number of occurrences or if it only had a few occurrences 
throughout the collection of data from interviews.  This constant comparing cycle continued as  
Table 10. Comparative Analysis Groupings
 
59 
 
interviews were conducted and from the previously analyzed interviews of CISOs.  The entire 
category candidates started out from the combined total of 1,783 analysis of sentences created 
during the interview process and reduced the number until the open coding cycle was completed. 
In this discussion, the researcher continued to use one comparatively analyzed sentence 
from Respondent Y4, Question 6, analysis of a sentence (‘number of ways of tracking’), 
response and folded this into the grouping called ensures compliance as represented in Table 11, 
Raw Sentence to Short Category. 
Table 11. Raw Sentence to Short Category 
 
 
Once the number of groupings reached a manageable number of possible categories, 35 
groupings, that resulted from the process.  Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping, showed the 
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results of comparative analysis, taking the sentences from all 32 CISOs and grouping like 
responses into groups that represented the data collected.  The single group in the table showed  
Table 12. Proposed Category Grouping 
Category Grouping 
Aligns Business CISO aligns ISS to business goals. Often business sets goals for CISO 
Aligns Business and IS CISO aligns with both business and IT goals 
Aligns IS CIO often dictates for CISO to align 
On its own Some CISOs have own budget and set goals themselves 
Ad Hoc CISOs have no guidance and mostly work on putting fires out, Use project plans as strategy 
Top Down Management driven 
Public Image Business did not support security, public image worth more, No support from Business 
Competitor Seeking to outdo everyone in the large organization, Competitiveness 
Continual Change Change is imminent and needing to be protected, Flexible, Adaptable, Agile 
Best Practice 
CISO looked to other examples in order to build their ISS for the best possible results; a lot 
of CISOs build once and use many times, mindset across government 
Re-Organization (While advanced, not much information obtained) 
Auditing Some performed audits to verify compliance 
Measurement and metrics Many measured results  
Ensures Compliance Majority tended to compliance as it is the law 
InfoSec Prg Recognition of an overall program as needed 
Priorities Prioritizing what matters in their program and according to whom it is a priority for 
Visionary Recognized the need to see a goal and have a vision for each goal 
Framework model method Looked to have a model to use for reaching a goal 
Structure of an ISS The actual process of developing a strategy (3 or 4 goals, max) 
Putting the Strategy to work Once devised, the strategy must work 
Shelfware Must be used or reverts to D2D or tactical 
Trust Customers must be able to trust CISO 
'Know' Security Recognized security as primary first step in process 
Protect Protection of data and information systems 
Communications & 
Collaboration 
Talking and getting message across is crucial to success  
Buy-in Recognition that buy-in from leadership (business/IT) is fundamental to the program 
Automation Speed of change requires automation or succumb to threats 
Operations & Risk Some recognized InfoSec and ISS is more than compliance and should fit to operations 
Paradigm Showed the shift from operations to threat 
threat driven, proactive, 
change 
While pursuing a standard CISO pursued next generation or preventing threat as opposed to 
chasing after and patching 
Qualified Staff 
Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-People, re-organization as it applies to 
having enough people 
Tools Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Tools 
Training Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Training 
Budget Can't do the job if you don't have the resources-Budget 
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one category proposal.  The number of major groupings or category candidates from the entire 
study whittled down to 35 total candidates.  Then a tool could be used to test the candidates for 
validity.  Scott and Howell (2008) advanced two tools for use by grounded theory researchers to 
use in testing candidates for categories.  The first tool, the conditional relationship guide (CRG) 
would be utilized to test groupings by answering a series of questions to establish category 
viability.   
 The final step of the open coding review utilized the conditional relationship guide (Scott 
& Howell, 2004).  For each candidate category, the information was extracted from the grouping 
and entered into the CRG, which was designed to answer questions about the what, when, where, 
why, how, and to what consequence the resulting category would have on the emergent theory 
yet to be realized (Scott & Howell, 2008).  Table 13, Conditional Relationship Guide, illustrates 
one category, ensures compliance, through the answering of the questions.  For the discussion, 
the researcher utilized this grounded theory tool, during open coding analysis that would assist in 
testing candidates for validity as categories.   
4.3.2 Open Coding Results  
As each proposed category was systematically tested with the CRG, the reviewer used the 
questioning techniques to populate a conditional relationship guide (Scott & Howell, 2008) for 
each proposed category.  Each cycle produced a varying amount of responses.  After several 
passes of evaluation by comparative analysis, an additional six groupings were combined into 
other groupings and it reduced the overall unique category list to 29 distinct categories.  The two 
columns of Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping, listed the tested categories of the CRG tool.  
Taking the categories to the next step, axial coding, the researcher sought to deduce the core 
category or central phenomenon of the study (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006). 
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Table 13. Conditional Relationship Guide 
Conditional Relationship Guide 
Category What When Where Why How Consequence 
Ensures 
Compliance 
 
(Category 
sentence-
Compliance 
provides a 
score of 
security, 
good or bad, 
that the 
CISO tracks 
according to 
law) 
ISS needs 
to cover 
compliance
. 
Complianc
e consists 
of 
checklists. 
Complianc
e measured 
through 
checklist 
completion. 
When 
systems are 
installed, 
compliance 
is a 
requirement 
for 
operation. 
Baseline 
used by 
scanners to 
check 
compliance 
on all assets. 
Checklists 
formed 
major 
portion of 
compliance 
to ensure 
standardizati
on of 
checking. 
Compliance 
checked on 
every device, 
system, and 
asset 
connected to 
the network 
Checklists 
established 
the standard 
for each 
device to be 
verified with. 
Scanning of 
assets also 
verified the 
completeness 
of 
configuring 
to the 
standard. 
Without 
standardization, 
organizational 
elements may 
be able to 
install assets 
with differing 
configurations. 
Standardization 
would also 
prevent 
different 
versions from 
being installed, 
especially those 
with 
deficiencies or 
vulnerabilities. 
Implement 
checklists to 
ensure 
compliance. 
Review and 
update 
checklists to 
ensure 
completenes
s, especially 
after an 
update or 
vulnerability 
patching. 
Without 
checklists, 
standardizatio
n or 
compliance 
would be 
harder to 
ensure. 
Without 
scanning for 
vulnerabilitie
s it would be 
hard to 
identify 
weaknesses. 
 
4.3.3 Axial Coding 
In the second step of the grounded theory coding process, axial coding, the researcher 
proceeded to further refine the initial grouping of categories and surmise the central or core 
phenomenon.  The researcher used constant comparison in coding and each time the researcher 
made a pass on the collected data it reduced or combined categories and brought similarities 
together into combined larger groupings.  For example, the researcher looked at the possibility of 
roles an information security professional could perform and found from the data that they could 
be grouped into several distinct role groupings.  There were several distinct types stated by 
respondents as captured in Table 14, Role Groupings to Categories.   
Bringing all the different types of roles into one large grouping resulted in a combination 
grouping or mapping to one large category called roles.  The combinations can then be called a 
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higher level or super category, one the researcher labeled as roles.  The process of further 
combining through comparative analysis of the categories ended with the result of four super 
group categories emerging from the data.  The labels of those super groupings could be 
characterized as roles, alignments, complexities, and resources that emerged from the data.  This 
began the start of analysis of each of the groups to be considered for the core category or central 
phenomenon (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006).  The researcher objectively evaluated each of 
the super categories for consideration as the core category. 
Table 14. Role Groupings to Categories  
Role Proposal Category Nomination 
Management driven Top Down 
Business did not support security, public 
image worth more, No support from 
Business 
Public Image 
Seeking to outdo everyone in the large 
organization, Competitiveness 
Competitor 
Change is imminent and needing to be 
protected, Flexible, Adaptable, Agile 
Continual Change 
CISO looked to other examples in order 
to build their ISS for the best possible 
results; a lot of CISOs build once and 
use many times, mindset across 
government 
Best Practice 
(While advanced, it was not utilized) Re-Organization 
Expanding the titles of the candidates for the four super categories were the roles CISOs 
chose, alignments of information security strategies, the complex structure of information 
security strategies, and the resources for performing information security strategy.  Since the 
researcher can not totally ignore the fact that a literature review was conducted, the researcher 
had to acknowledge the fact that many similarities existed in the roles and alignments.  
Recognizing this, the researcher consciously let only the collected data drive the construction of 
categories.  The first two proposed super categories seemingly echoed the results of the literature 
review in Chapter 2, in that there were several roles information security professionals adopted 
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to implement their information security programs in the large government organization through 
the information security strategy (Carter, Grover, & Bennett Thatcher, 2011; Weill & Woerner, 
2013).  Second, the alignment of the information security strategy in the large government 
organization closely followed the discussion conducted in Chapter 2, Review of the Literature, 
which illustrated possible types of strategy alignments within an organization, in general 
(Wagner & Weitzel, 2012).  It should be noted that the literature review considered literature that 
was oriented and focused primarily from non-public sector organizations.  The data collected 
here represented public sector information security, in that it came completely from large 
government organizations.  The results then should reflect purely what public sector 
organizations experience.  For the third category, the analysis of the collected data looked at the 
complex structure of an information security strategy.  Resources, the fourth category might fall 
outside the scope as a core category.  Resources primarily aided in sustainment of the 
information security strategy efforts and could be a factor in keeping it moving, affecting long 
term changes, but not in the development of the strategy.  The four categories are expanded in 
the next four paragraphs to highlight an overview of how each of the four super group categories 
were derived. 
4.3.3.1 Proposed Roles Category 
The first of the super categories was that of the roles category, which had CISOs 
primarily expressing the need to keep compliance at the forefront, because of mandated, 
regulatory law to report on system compliance utilizing recommended security controls as a 
major part of their job (Corbet; 2014).  In addition, most CISOs utilized other roles to varying 
degrees that needed to be performed, such as having top down leadership, ensuring the public 
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image, competing with other organizations, always changing their approach, adopting or 
adapting to best practices, and or in rare occasions re-organizing to accept resource constraints. 
4.3.3.2 Proposed Alignments Category 
Alignments considered the way in which CISOs lined up goals to meet business and or 
information systems goals and objectives.  Additional alignments looked at how CISOs 
performed security on their own and addressed daily breaches and incidents.  Some CISOs also 
expressed concern that they had no direction from leadership.  Respondent T8 (personal 
communication, February 19, 2014) stated, “But we do not have a written down strategy.  We 
make decisions as we go along.  We do not have it written down, we just do it.  It is not written, 
it is in people’s heads,” which summarizes the lack of direction in some units.  The CISOs made 
the best of their unique situations addressing information security on their own.  The categories 
under the alignment super category were captured as business, business and information systems, 
information systems, information security on their own, and ad-hoc or no security. 
4.3.3.3 Proposed Complexities Category 
Complexities of the information security strategy surfaced in every interview, be it from 
the whole strategy being too complex to start or being as simple as the strategy being a three step 
process used each and every day.  The complexities involved with the information security 
strategy surfaced throughout the whole process of strategy creation to finish and what the 
strategy should be composed of: vision, mission needs, communications and collaboration, 
knowing security, trust, buy-in, and developing a strategy.   
4.3.3.4 Proposed Resources Category 
CISOs expressed that resources as an area essential to keeping an information security 
program operating, but was not essential for its formation.  Resources are important to CISOs as 
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attention was given to ensure qualified personnel are working for them, along with needing 
recurring training and having appropriate security tools being made available for day to day use 
in performing duties.  Respondent F5 (personal communication, December 30, 2013), 
emphasized tools when stating, “What tools are we using now and then six months down the 
road and how that fits into the architecture.”  Another category within the resources super 
category was that of having enough budget to sustain operations, to purchase tools, hire 
personnel, and keep the [security] skills current (Office of the Inspector General (OIG); (2013).  
The results of the combining of categories into larger groupings of a similar nature also shared 
the focus of the study shifting from the strategy as a focal point to that of the CISO being the 
fulcrum or leveraging point. 
4.3.4 Axial Coding Results  
 Through the continued use of the CRG, the researcher combed the collected data and the 
35 proposed categories that advanced from open coding.  Each proposed category was entered 
into the CRG form and evaluated.  Some ended up being very similar to others and the researcher 
subsequently combined them together.  As the process continued, the researcher began to group 
unique, but similar categories together.  As this continued, the first cut of grouping categories 
under the roles grouping (Table 14, Role Groupings to Categories) showed one batch of similar 
categories.  Three other grouping also emerged from the CRG review process, for a total of 24 
categories within the resultant four groupings.  Table 15, Alignment Groupings to Categories; 
Table 16, Complexities Groupings to Categories; and Table 17, Resources Groupings to 
Categories emerged to capture the other possibilities that categories could be combined from 
Table 12, Proposed Category Grouping.  These four main groupings: roles, alignment, 
complexities, and resources were then advanced to the selective coding process. 
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Table 15. Alignment Groupings to Categories  
Role Proposal Category Nomination 
CISO aligns ISS to business goals. 
Often business sets goals for CISO 
Business 
CISO aligns with both business and IT 
goals 
Business and Information 
Systems 
CIO often dictates for CISO to align Information Systems 
Some CISOs have own budget and sets 
goals themselves 
Information Security 
CISOs have no guidance and mostly 
work on putting fires out.  Use project 
plans as startegy 
None 
 
Table 16. Complexities Groupings to Categories  
Role Proposal Category Nomination 
Recognized the need to see a goal and 
have a vision for each goal 
Visionary 
Prioritizing what matters in their 
program and according to whom it is a 
priority for 
Mission Needs 
Talking & getting message across is 
crucial to success 
Communications 
Recognized security as primary first 
step in process 
Know Security 
Customers must be able to trust CISO Trust 
Recognition that buy-in from leadership 
is fundamental to the program 
Buy-in 
The actual process of making a strategy 
(3 or 4 goals, max) 
Develop 
 
Table 17. Resources Groupings to Categories  
Role Proposal Category Nomination 
Need to have adequate funds to operate 
the program 
Budget 
Must have appropriate tools to perform 
inspection 
Tools 
Need to have qualified people to use 
tools and find security anomalies 
Personnel 
Personnel need to obtain training to 
maintain skills 
Training 
 
68 
 
4.3.5 Selective Coding 
The researcher continued the analysis of the collected data into the final step of selective 
coding to consider what makes an information security strategy complex; how it is formed; what 
sustains it; how it lines up with other strategies; and what role(s) the CISO selected to meet the 
tenets of the information security program. 
The initial research problem stated the researcher should review the data collected and it 
might produce an understanding of the complexities of an information security strategy.  The 
study should reveal what the differing roles are for an information security professional and the 
ways in which an information security professional differentiates one information security 
strategy from another.  Additionally, the study might help identify how information security 
strategies differ within a large government organization and the way in which the organization 
might drive the information security strategy.  The four large areas revealed from the study were 
ones to look at roles, alignments, complexities, and resources.  Each of which is key to 
developing the core category of CISO actions to achieve a strategy. 
4.3.5.1 Roles 
The majority of CISOs expressed the main role category in use was compliance, it was 
central to functioning in the organization.  Conversely, a majority of CISOs also revealed that 
couple of minor roles were not used frequently within the category.  The main roles not used 
frequently by information security professionals were public image, competitor, re-organization 
and power relationships, of which, power relationships was not in use at all.  The four major 
roles in use by the information security professionals were compliance, continual change, best 
practices, and top down (Seeholzer, 2012).  Figure 2, Roles, illustrates the centrality of roles that 
the CISO used.  Compliance was the one all the CISOs used (depicted as central) and to varying 
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degrees parts of the other roles were utilized in the public sector.  The root or purpose of the 
information security program was to protect and ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(CIA) of data and information systems entrusted to information security (Krutz & Vines, 2001).  
The compliance role an information security professional uses was to classify each information 
system according to guidelines published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) (Computer Security Division (CSD); 2004).  The information security professional must 
also comply with FISMA scorecard requirements (Burwell, 2013; Corbet, 2014). 
  
Figure 2. Roles 
 
Information security professionals also expressed the need for continual change, adapting to 
events as they evolved over time between updates of their information security strategy.  The 
CISOs saw this in two ways.  Illustrative of this was what Respondent E3 (personal 
communication, December 26, 2013), who stated, “Within the CISO organization it is an 
adaptive process of realizing that our priorities can change…operations tempo, threat movement, 
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emerging technology and other factors in order to realize your overall vision.”   First, continual 
change meant that the business section of the organization continually changed the way in which 
security was to operate and periodically levied new requirements on the information security 
section, sometimes without prior coordination.  Respondent E3 (personal communications, 
December 26, 2013), said, “Basically, the ground rules must be prioritized then the stakeholders 
can understand when they have skin in the game and when they need to prioritize; when and 
where they need to re-prioritize against competing priorities.”  Multiple CISOs confirmed that 
their management did in fact change course several times over the entirety of a fiscal year.  The 
second method CISOs explained was a more agile approach, one in which they looked at the way 
the information security professional should continually evaluate their progress towards meeting 
the goals of their strategy and making adjustments as necessary.  Many did not, but a few of the 
CISOs did use their plan and adjusted it periodically over the course of the fiscal year.  
Respondent P5 (personal communications, April 23, 2014), captured this when stating, “Some of 
the priorities are out of your control.  The organization will set them for you.  The chief 
information officer is going to set them and you are going to have higher organizational goals.  
The priorities are set from up channel.”  Those that did adapt, regularly met the objectives of 
their strategy.  Those that did not might have, but often just reacted to situations as they arose. 
Information security professionals explored industry best practices as well.  Best business 
practices covered the entire range of activities from using step by step instructions of a keep it 
simple basic instructional book (Olsen, 2007) to trying to achieve level five of a capability 
maturity model integration (CMMI) framework (Bunker, 2012; CMMI Team, 2010).  
Respondent J7 (personal communication, December 31, 2013), summed it up in saying, 
“Information security strategy means to me that it is very, very simple, it is how we are going to 
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accurately and effectively accomplish our mission.  It is the stepping stones from point A to 
point B and without honesty and a logical process, you will never have an accurate strategy…”  
Information security professionals also reviewed and selected practices from business process 
reengineering, and efficiency models like the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) and strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) methodology (Moen & Norman, 2009; Team 
Free Management Ebooks (FME), 2014).   Top down driven structures existed and the CISO 
reacted as a result of being driven or driving information security with the work force.  Many 
CISOs had priorities placed upon them by upper management dictating or guiding how they 
should perform the information security program.  One respondent pointed out that the CIO can 
change their direction when stating, “Priorities may also change by chief information officer 
(CIO) mandated priorities.  When the CIO says so, then it is so” (Respondent C7, personal 
communication, December 17, 2013).”  In driving their work force, CISOs also had some 
autonomy to mirror image the top down driven nature by guiding or directing how their work 
force performed.  These were the roles observed from the interviews conducted with the CISOs 
from the organizations.  Another super category that helped them realize potential was through 
resources and the ways in which CISOs utilized personnel. 
4.3.5.2 Alignments 
  Some CISOs stated that information security has been seen as just an additional 
expenditure by business, the information security program has far too often been given bare 
minimums to meet regulatory law and then allowed to function in any way possible to meet the 
additional regulatory requirements.  Respondent S1 (personal communication, February 12, 
2014) captured this when stating, “It is hard to get funding with so many competing priorities.  It 
is hard because information security is not seen, but when something goes wrong, everyone 
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comes screaming.”  CISOs that operate in an ad-hoc manner are left to address one issue after 
another and do not have a formal strategic plan to work towards measuring whether they are 
successful or not in accomplishing their information security program.  Respondent P5 (personal 
communication, April 23, 2014) identified the problem when stating they always tracked the 
fires before working the strategy. “But, when fires do flare up, no matter where they happen, I 
drop everything and then track those. We do work the CIO’s priorities after the fires are 
extinguished, but we will address fires when they come up first.”  The CISO organizations that 
operate on their own tend to operate correctly, if the CISO operates correctly, but tend to fail if 
the CISO is forced to accomplish tasks that increase risk across the organization.  Figure 3, 
Alignments, illustrates the possible alignments for information security strategies. 
 
Figure 3. Alignments 
Each organization operated differently, to meet their particular mission needs.  The 
researcher found that CISOs in each sub-section of the large organization had parts that were 
similar and some that differed in their mission from the overall large organization.  Each sub-
section or small unit aligned their information security strategy to meet mission need.  All five of 
the proposed alignments covered in Chapter 2 were in operation in the large organization and 
among the different participant sub organizations.  The two most numerous types of alignments 
were the information security strategy aligned with both business and information systems 
strategies and the second was that quite a few organizations operated in an ad-hoc fashion, 
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having no strategy and no internal system other than tactically moving to address one crisis after 
another.  
4.3.5.3 Complexities 
As a part of the comparative analysis and combining of statements during the coding 
process, several categories combined and made up the parts of what was termed the super 
category of complexities of an information security strategy.  This super category, complexities, 
was divided up into the sub categories called: vision, mission needs, communications and 
collaboration, knowing security, trust, buy-in, and developing strategy.  Each of the sub 
categories meshed into the others, but is also a component part of the entire super category of 
complexities.  Figure 4, Complexities, illustrates the connectedness of sub parts combining and 
resulting in a coherent strategy based upon the goals of the information security professional, 
business, and information security strategy goals. 
 
Figure 4. Complexities 
Vision really focused on the CISO having an outlook for the next three to seven years as 
to where they wanted to take the organization in a secure manner, identifying risk, and informing 
leadership of actions necessary to address risk.  “We look towards the next five to seven years in 
our projections via the roadmap,” (Respondent A0, personal communication, December 11, 
2013). The CISO considered mission needs to set priorities for the information security strategy.  
He or she conferred with stakeholders to ensure security gets involved at the start of a project 
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instead of finding out about projects affecting security that have already been deployed.  CISOs 
must communicate and collaborate with everyone involved in information systems and business.  
Respondent P5 (personal communication, April 23, 2014) stated it best as, “Information security 
takes a collective, collaborative approach that is rare for an organization that can actually achieve 
it.  So your information security strategy is really one of collaborative team building and 
focusing on value to the business unit.”  Communications must take place whenever there is the 
chance to discuss threats and take advantage of opportunities to talk about mitigations to threats 
(Scully, 2014).   
Knowing security is key when working to get security built into the beginning of the 
systems development lifecycle.  CISOs must investigate emerging technology, keeping one step 
ahead of what is currently in use on the network.  The ability of CISOs to build trust, to keep 
stakeholders informed, and gain their assurance that they are kept apprised of all issues involving 
security is another key element.  Respondent L9 (December 19, 2013) posed the question about 
trust as, “How strong is your relationship, the level of support and trust by your leadership?” 
Leadership must receive correct information from CISOs in order to gain and to maintain the 
trust of leadership.   The CISO must also be able to market security to executives throughout the 
organization and obtain buy-in or support from top level executives.  Buy-in is fundamental to 
the success of strategy (Hu, Dinev, Hart, & Cooke, 2012).  The art of developing the strategy 
takes place by building it from the start using all the pieces of the complexities super category, 
keeping it small, but encompassing all of the information security program.  CISOs stated the 
strategy should be limited to three or four overarching goals.  One respondent touched upon it 
when stating, “The information security strategy needs to be simple.  Complexity is the enemy of 
strategy,” (Respondent L9, personal communication, December 19, 2013).  And, Respondent V8 
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(personal communication, January 31, 2014) narrowed it when stating that, “…seven or eight 
elements gets down to three or four goals.  Then we can look at an information security strategy 
in a three year plan.”  The goals should be achievable within the allotted timeframe of the 
strategy.  And, most important of all, the goals should be written in such a way as to allow them 
to be used and checked periodically for completion.   
A comparative analysis of CISO statements showed that the complexity of an information 
security strategy is a chain of events, yet it is interconnected and meshed.  Figure 5, 
Complexities, illustrates the chain of events flowing from one end to the other for 
accomplishment.  The information security strategy is a dynamic operation centered on the 
vision of the CISO and aligning to the goals of a higher order strategy.  Developing a strategy is 
an active process requiring constant attention.  It also requires shaping through alignment in the 
organization and leadership from the CISO actively working through various roles. 
4.3.5.4 Resources  
CISOs highlighted the need for resources again and again when asked the question of 
“…what a successful information security strategy needed..,” (Table 5, Interview Question 
Rationale) to sustain it.  Resources consisted of four categories, those of training, qualified 
personnel, tools, and budget.  CISOs wanted to have recurring training for personnel, especially 
information security skills, but also a greater emphasis on business training--in order to learn 
how to communicate with stakeholders.  Respondent J7 (personal communication, December 11, 
2013) pointed this out when saying, “…qualified staff to support the priorities of the 
organization is paramount.”  Figure 5, Resources, depicts how the categories of resources 
related, how they are interactive with one another, and that each category helps to sustain the 
super category.  One of the other primary goals of the CISO was  
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Figure 5. Resources 
that they must also hire qualified personnel.  CISOs recognized they were competing with 
commercial sector organizations that can pay much more for equivalently trained security 
personnel.  This made it much harder for the CISOs to keep experienced personnel.  CISOs noted 
that training was complicated and could cause problems in that while training up personnel is 
good, once they were trained many could move on to higher paying jobs.  Figure 5, Resources, 
illustrates that training is an integral part of being qualified personnel.  The challenge for the 
CISO was to identify what skills workers needed and attempt to gain the opportunity of 
obtaining the necessary skills to build all the workers to the same level.  The CISOs wanted to 
allow for people to stay and develop.  Some CISOs wanted to have career paths to help personnel 
remain and develop through the ranks of being a novice, learner, peer, trainer, and eventually a 
supervisor.  The CISO must always be proactive in developing the individual, allowing them to 
mature or run the risk of people moving to other jobs.  Mentoring is a prime requirement.  Not 
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only should the CISO be training his or her replacement, but also explaining what goes on in 
their decision making process.  Teaching the recruits was the means for critical thinking and how 
the CISO arrived at their decisions would help to recruit and to also cement relationships with 
management.   
Tools are also necessary to keep current with ever evolving malware.  CISOs were always 
searching for ways to improve software tools through added capabilities and or automation, to 
get the full usage of the features of the software tools.  Lastly, it is imperative to have a budget to 
allow security to function efficiently.  The CISO must become business development experts.  
The CISO must find and build the examples that can show return on investment, not so much in 
security, but as a result of security, in how much the organization can save in prevention (i.e., 
keeping the organization from exploits and the action that saves the organization a certain 
amount of money per asset, because a compromise usually results in lost time, productivity, 
assets, and or the possibility of even needing to replace an asset).  Figure 5, Resources, depicts 
how all of these categories meld together to form the super category of resources which are the 
way the information security strategy is sustained. 
 Having identified the four super categories, the researcher sought to allow each to fit 
together in different ways and see how the super categories would identify the core category or 
central phenomenon (Brown, et al., 2002; Hallberg, 2006).   Figure 6, Super Categories, shows 
the four super categories and how each affects the outcomes of the others.  The arrows indicate 
dependence of one category upon the others.  There are multiple ways to weave the categories 
together into a story.  The process of meshing or weaving the categories together using selective 
coding should reveal the core category in the results.   
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Figure 6. Super Categories 
4.3.6 Selective Coding Results  
The researcher used the second tool of grounded theory, called the reflective coding 
matrix (RCM) as the tool for the grounded theory coding process.  According to Scott and 
Howell (2008), obtaining the theory or model from the data is the most difficult part of the 
coding process.  The selective coding step results from the building of a story extracted from the 
data.  By presenting the data from the collected categories in the form of collected categories one 
can deduce a logical flow as the relationships are built from the coding process.  The story is of 
how all these super categories feed together and focus upon telling the story from the CISO’s 
viewpoint in how they hierarchically work together and culminate into a core category (Hallberg, 
2006).   
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To capture the results of the axial coding step, the researcher borrowed and used the 
second tool that Scott and Howell (2008) introduced that was called the reflective coding matrix 
(RCM), which allowed comparative analysis to proceed in whittling the selections down into a 
core category from the four super category groups.  The process of the RCM assisted the 
researcher in developing a form to capture the processes, properties, dimensions, contexts, and  
Table 18. Reflective Coding Matrix 
Reflective Coding Matrix 
Core Category CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy 
Processes Selecting the proper 
role 
Adjusting to the 
proper alignment 
Figuring out 
complexities of 
strategy 
Obtaining enough 
resources 
Properties Observe and adapt to 
the climate 
Align to proper 
direction 
Decide on what is 
right 
Lobbying for stuff 
Dimensions Selecting to either be 
management driven, 
assume public image 
worth more, seek to 
outdo everyone, adopt 
best possible result 
from others, reinvent 
the structure, always 
change, and or 
comply with law 
To be business, 
information system, 
or information 
security driven, or 
have no direction 
Market for Buy-in 
Gain trust 
Know security 
Have a vision 
Limit the scope 
Establish 
priorities 
Adopt proactive 
approach 
Have qualified 
people 
Get enough tools to 
perform 
information 
security tasks 
Acquire the correct 
training 
Gain enough 
funding to 
complete the 
strategy 
Contexts Support the mission Coordinating and 
deciding linkages 
Establishing  
mutual goals 
Scoping reality 
Modes for 
understanding 
the consequences 
Bounds the proper 
approach 
Reaching 
compromise that 
meets objectives 
Collaborate on 
results  
Having sufficient 
funds to obtain 
needs 
 
modes for understanding the consequences put forth through the CRG.  The RCM depicted 
several interactions between the aspects of the core category (processes, properties, dimensions, 
contexts, and modes) in the left hand column for each of the four super categories or categories 
(roles, alignments, complexities, and resources) in the successive columns moving from left to 
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right.  Each assesses an aspect of the category and how it reflects into the core category of ‘CISO 
actions to achieve a strategy.’ 
Through the steps of filling in and assessing the areas of the RCM, the results were clear 
that the actions taken to achieve the strategy itself were the most critical part of the core category 
and one the CISOs also started time after time during the interviews.  They, the CISOs, were the 
core to taking the action in achieving a strategy.  Table 18, Reflective Coding Matrix illustrated 
the intricate relations of the four super categories into the core category of ‘CISO actions to 
achieve a strategy.’  The researcher used the selective coding process to build the story of the 
core category selection and the emergent theory that came forth using the RCM elements 
(Hallberg, 2006; Pandit, 1996; Scott & Howell, 2008). 
 From the data collected and analyzed, the researcher presented a way to depict a 
breakdown of the super categories discovered from the data.  Figure 7, Mapping the Categories, 
captured in an image from breaking down each of the super categories into the categories found 
to comprise each individual super category.  This figure shows each category (underlined) as a 
 
Figure 7. Mapping the Categories 
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part of each super category (circled) and that the relation to the central theme was yet to be 
structured.  Figure 6, Super Categories, depicts how the dependencies exist between the super 
categories.  The way in which a model emerges is if the CISO is inserted at the start of the 
decision making process; meaning that the CISO defines how to utilize roles, takes part in 
alignment, participates in complexities, and lobbied for resources then the ISS is formed. 
In order to arrive at the core category, the researcher compared and contrasted the four 
super categories on their own merits to possibly identify the central or core category.  The 
categories listed in Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, as 12 possible sequences of 
accomplishment of a theory covered all the possible combinations of the four super categories. 
Assuming the CISO is the only participant in investigating the roles of information 
security strategy and having a direct effect on the information security program, then there would 
be three areas that are out of their direct control: complexities, alignment, and resources.  
Resources would be beyond the scope of this study, since the evaluation here is upon 
investigating the roles of an information security strategy.  Resources would be useful for 
evaluating sustainment and supporting day-to-day activities.  Hence, resources would be apt to 
be in the last position of the four super categories.  This action would eliminate outcomes 2, 3, 4, 
6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.  Outcomes 1, 5, and 7 would be the only viable ones.  Since the CISO 
starts with a role, outcome 1 and 7 could also be eliminated leaving outcome 5 as the only 
selectable outcome to evaluate.   
To consider outcomes 1 and 7, the study focuses on actions taken to move the direction 
of an information security program towards achieving confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of data and systems.  Alignments may receive input from the CISO, but is mostly arrived at by a 
combination of business and or information systems decisions to support mission along with the 
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Table 19. Table of Outcomes to Select 
Outcome     
1 Complexities Alignments Roles Resources 
2 Complexities Roles Resources Alignments 
3 Complexities Resources Alignments Roles 
4 Roles Complexities Resources Alignments 
5 Roles Alignments Complexities Resources 
6 Roles Resources Alignments Complexities 
7 Alignments Roles Complexities Resources 
8 Alignments Complexities Resources Roles 
9 Alignments Resources Roles Complexities 
10 Resources Complexities Alignments Roles 
11 Resources Alignments Roles Complexities 
12 Resources Roles Complexities Alignments 
 
CISO.  In lieu of having any alignment, the CISO may institute a self-sufficient approach on its 
own or opt to practice no alignment, just operate from one situation to the next.  Hence, 
alignments should be considered of importance, but placed in the second position of the equation 
above complexities in the outcome, further justifying outcome 5. 
Complexities may exist in varying stages from the three stakeholders within a range of 
strategy being derived from information systems, business, or information security.  The actual 
strategy results from the interaction or lack of interaction between stakeholders of the 
organization.  The CISO creates the strategy based upon inputs from the stakeholders.  The CISO 
must then consider all the factors or complexities of building the strategy that would then align 
with the alignments agreed upon with management and resources that are available.  Hence, the 
complexities fit in the third position after alignments, but before resources thus limiting outcome 
to number 5.   
As an alternative view of the previous analysis and one that uses storylines for the 
analysis, the researcher began to view as a CISO would from the data collected.  The CISO must 
select the story most likely to succeed in meeting management’s selection of a goal and align 
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next with the role to the mission of their organization using supplied resources.  CISOs look at 
the summarized possible outcomes from Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, and read the 
story of using super categories in possible outcomes to create the most viable one.  Thus, each 
plot would read as follows: 
 Develop complexities of an information security strategy, consider strategic alignment, 
execute necessary roles, and be supplied by resources 
 Develop complexities of an information security strategy, execute necessary roles, be  
supplied by resources, and consider strategic alignment 
 Develop complexities of an information security strategy, be supplied by resources, 
consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles  
 Execute necessary roles, develop the complexities of an information security strategy, be 
supplied by resources, and consider strategic alignment 
 Execute necessary roles, consider strategic alignment, develop the complexities of an 
information security strategy, and be supplied by resources  
 Execute necessary roles, be supplied by resources, consider strategic alignment, and  
develop complexities of an information security strategy 
 Consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles, develop complexities of an 
information security strategy, and be supplied by resources 
 Consider strategic alignment, develop complexities of an information security strategy, 
be supplied by resources, and execute necessary roles 
 Consider strategic alignment, be supplied by resources, execute necessary roles, and 
develop complexities of an information security strategy 
 Be supplied by resources, develop complexities of an information security strategy, 
consider strategic alignment, and execute necessary roles 
 Be supplied by resources, consider strategic alignment, execute necessary roles, and 
develop complexities of an information security strategy  
 Be supplied by resources, execute necessary roles, develop complexities of an 
information security strategy, and consider strategic alignment 
 
From the statements in the bulleted list, analysis could help eliminate the majority of 
assertions.  The first set of three bullets can be dismissed, since the ‘develop complexities of an 
information security strategy’ is the outcome of alignments working together to reach consensus.  
The strategy captures the agreements.  The second set of three bullets, ‘executing necessary 
roles’ captures the essence of what a CISO does as a result of aligning to a strategy, which is a 
primary outcome.  The third set of three bullets, ‘consider strategic alignment’ is the action a 
CISO performs to gauge leadership of the organization, aligning it to the way in which the 
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strategy is crafted and is an outcome of the alignment of leadership working together to reach 
consensus.  Alignments work in tandem with the strategy as it is the way work is done to codify 
the strategy.  The fourth set of three bullets, ‘be supplied by resources’ considers the sustainment 
of the information security program after consensus is reached among leadership for a role and 
an alignment and a strategy or a plan is codified to propose the way to achieve the information 
security strategy, but it is the actions taken by the CISO which implements the strategy.  The 
CISO must choose the role they play in moving towards completion. Thus the outcome would 
come from the second set of three.  
Looking again at the second set of three, beginning with the words ‘execute necessary 
roles,’ The CISO investigates management’s alignment, as one where security operates on its 
own, with information systems, with business, or with the cooperation of business and 
information systems, recognizing who is in charge and working through the process to reach an 
outcome.  This is the alignment that the CISO moves towards to achieve the goals of their 
information security program.  The complexities are the vision of the CISO to gain alignment 
and consensus to achieve the desired outcomes of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
data and the information systems they are responsible for and to work with available resources 
provided to accomplish the information security program.   
The story from the matrix presented in Table 19, Table of Outcomes to Select, shows the 
best outcome of a CISO as the ability to select a role, determine an acceptable alignment and 
match complexities to a desired outcome.  The CISO accomplishes all these actions while 
working within the scope of available resources.  The CISO should “execute necessary roles, 
consider strategic alignment, develop the complexities of an information security strategy, and be 
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supplied by resources.”  The following discussion looks at an analysis of the data after selecting 
this narrative or story of the super categories. 
The researcher needed to select and support the statement best capturing the results of 
open and axial coding.  Using the reflective coding matrix, the researcher combined the super 
categories and found that the CISO recognizes and selects a role or combination of roles they 
deem necessary to perform the mission of information security.  The CISO seeks to align their 
vision of the strategy to the direction of the organization.  In their organization they may need to 
be with business, information system, on their own, or some combination of the three.  The CISO 
then begins to construct the strategy to achieve the vision and align to stakeholder’s requirements 
using the supplied resources.   Evaluating the processes or casual conditions in the reflective 
coding matrix, the information revealed that CISOs focused on the roles chosen to implement a 
strategy.  Role selection was seen as the primary area the CISO could control, because they had 
the freedom to decide in which way to operate.  Role selection turned into a complicated process 
that they had to consider the outside factors of alignment and the strategy developed to meet their 
mission which also had to support organizational goals.  While designing the way in which their 
part of the organization formed, the CISOs, by consensus stated their program must be forward 
looking.  Respondent Q3 (personal communication, January 23, 2014) stated, “The information 
security strategy boils down to and in its simplest definition is the forward looking strategy a 
leader has in their head to address information security problems of today, but also for tomorrow 
as well.”  They needed to have a strategy of a manageable size consisting of three to four goals, 
and these goals needed to be achievable or attainable within a set period of time.  Mostly this 
was defined as a fiscal year, from October first through September thirtieth of the following year.  
The strategy must define what is important and what is to be protected.  It must also foster a 
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culture of security presenting ways in which to develop and foster a participative community 
amongst users of the organization.  Information security professionals must be communicative 
and collaborative around the organization.  Cultivating and germinating security to the general 
populace of the organization.  The next section considers the CISO as the linchpin of the 
organization and the deciding factor in which way the information security program leans using 
their role, alignment, and complexity (strategy) in the organization. 
4.4 The Result 
The previous sections considered the categories used by the CISOs and discovered ways 
to work and implement their information security programs.  In this final section, the analyzed 
data is studied to produce the steps a CISO follows to investigate their role with the information 
security strategy.  Using the data collected, following the discovery process the CISO 
investigates where or how they should align with leadership and choose the best role to start 
with.  If receptive, the CISO aligns with business and or information systems, and participates 
with the development of a strategy, forming the framework of a strategy.  If leadership is not 
receptive, the alignment either leans towards information systems or remains within the 
information security environment leaning on regulatory requirements as their force for 
compliance by law.  If there is an unlikely situation where leadership does not participate, yet 
dictates that no security shall be practiced or only to a level such as that which only obtains 
system certification and accreditation to operate.  The organization devolves into an ad hoc 
situation wherein the CISO is always reactive and does not achieve desired goals.  Respondent J7 
(personal communication, December 31, 2013), stated it best by saying, “Unfortunately, our 
priorities are based on a reactive methodology.  I have priorities clearly communicated to 
leadership, to my staff, and to others, but unfortunately being we are so short staffed, we cannot 
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execute those priorities effectively and when something happens all those priorities are pushed to 
the side to fix a top priority at hand.”  The data in the study revealed that none of the programs 
reached the extreme end of having no security, but in certain situations some CISOs were 
required to implement systems without proper controls, especially where new technology was 
involved.   
The way to explain this is that the CISO works to align their strategy by speaking directly 
with leadership.  From the start, the CISO seeks where in the alignment process they are situated.  
Whether they are operating on their own, or with information systems, business, or both.  The 
formation of a strategy is devised by a consensus process of the three stakeholder groups 
(business, information systems, and information security) working together or by being directed 
and agreeing to some form of direction.  A discussion ensues back and forth from the CISO 
during the forming stage of the strategy and there are some possible extra steps back through 
leadership as the CISO confers with leadership on a direction (in the alignment step), until 
consensus is reached.  Once the strategy is formed, the CISO identifies the goals listed and 
makes the decisions to select a role for implementation of the strategy to achieve the goals.  
Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy, depicts this aforementioned process.   
Once decided, the role selected was applied, the strategy is implemented and resources 
are utilized to accomplish the implementation.  The CISO then makes the final decision as to 
which role to select that is then used to work the strategy goals and implement them for the 
completion of the information security program, realizing the agreed upon goals.  Resources help 
to implement the strategy and achieve goals.  Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy, 
depicts this emergent method of action, the story of how CISOs in a large organization 
systematically operated.   
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Figure 8. CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy 
 
As a step by step explanation of the process, the CISO initially chooses a role (most often 
one of compliance, based in law).  The CISO coordinates with stakeholders to decide upon on 
alignment.  The alignment step is a cyclic action between CISO, role, alignment, Strategy 
(formation), until stakeholders form a strategy.  Once the strategy is formed, the CISO in the 
second part selects role(s) to sustain operations for implementing the strategy and is indirectly 
assisted with resources to achieve the strategy at the end. 
Conspicuously, the four super categories have dependencies that show relationships 
between roles, alignments, complexities, and resources (refer to Figure 6, Super Categories).  A 
breakdown of the four super categories is covered under the axial coding results section and is 
illustrated in Figure 7, Mapping the Categories.  Taking figure 6, Super Categories and Figure 7, 
mapping the categories, the researcher deduced the interplay into Figure 8, CISO actions to 
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achieve a strategy.  In most organizations, CISOs have assumed a role, have an alignment, and 
they have limited resources, but most do not have a strategy.  They are left to fend for themselves 
in many situations where incidents occur.  As Respondent Q3 (personal communication, January 
23, 2014) reported, “If I sum it up, we react to fires every day and would not be able to keep up 
with it.  So when you have an information security strategy, it would allow you to be proactive 
and address the problems.” 
CISOs have assumed a role.  By the analysis, many CISOs were left to find out their own 
roles for any given situation.  Either management did not give any direction as to what was 
required and the CISO ended up creating their own strategy or the CISO just reacted to each 
incident as it transpired.  The role most often assumed was that of compliance, as depicted in the 
super category roles (refer to Figure 2, Roles) and depicted in the lower right hand corner of 
Figure 7, Mapping the Categories.  The compliance role had a central position, as all CISOs 
identified compliance as a must do activity.  This section details the CISO action to select an 
initial role. 
Most CISOs had an alignment.  The information gleaned from an analysis of the data 
collected showed there were two main alignments for CISOs.  Firstly, there was a large number 
of CISOs who were aligned with the CIO (information systems) and business.  These CISOs had 
a relationship built with their leadership and kept them informed of risk and abided by the 
decisions leadership specified.  Secondly, there was a large number of CISOs who had no 
alignment and were left out of the leadership’s activities and essentially these CISOs were 
always performing information security duties in a purely reactive mode.  “Unfortunately, our 
priorities are based on a reactive methodology (Respondent J7, personal communication, 
December 31, 2013).  They were always working on cleaning up incidents as opposed to having 
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a strategy that could look to prevent events from transpiring.  The CISOs without an alignment 
did desire to know what leadership was involved with and ultimately could help leadership make 
informed decisions, but were excluded from taking part in system development prior to 
implementation.  There were a few CISOs who operated solely under the direction of the CIO 
and a single CISO who worked directly with the business function.  For the most part, the CISOs 
that associated and worked with business and the CIO were from larger units in the organization.  
The CISOs from smaller units in the large organization were left to either create their own rules 
or were always remediating situations management found themselves in by ignoring information 
security.  This covered the interactions between CISOs, roles, and alignments as depicted in 
Figure 8, CISO actions to achieve a strategy. 
Most CISOs did not have a strategy.  When pressed closer, the CISOs stated that they did 
not have a formal strategy.  The CISO that had only an informal strategy stated they did not have 
time to write a formal strategy and they simply performed duties as they were required, operating 
very tactically patching one incident after another without gaining any headway in the process.  
One CISO stated they had a formal strategy, but it was not approved yet.  Respondent Z7 
(personal communication, February 19, 2014), stated, “There is nothing in place, we try to build 
a management directive, internal for an information security strategy, but it is not formalized, so 
I will not elaborate on it until it is finalized.”  A few other CISOs said they utilized the CIO’s 
strategy as their own.  It was most preferable to have their own, but the CISO stated they would 
accept the larger organization’s strategy or even working under the CIO as a back up plan.  Many 
stated they referred to the strategy written by the CISO from the headquarters or lead unit in the 
organization.  All stated that the strategy involved a lot of hard work.  The work involved teams, 
coordination, and mechanics for developing the vision against mission needs and arriving at 
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goals for information security.  Much of the development process goes beyond the scope of the 
study here.  The main thrust being to coordinate the inputs to capture goals, and codify them with 
other stakeholders in their organization.  This embodies the hard work of forming the strategy 
through interactions of stakeholders, CISOs, and teams who work for the CISO. 
Having the strategy, the cycle would be almost complete, but the influence of resources 
does play a part in investigating roles of the information security strategy.  Most CISOs have 
limited resources.  Some CISOs had an abundance of funds and were able to guide personnel 
into career paths beneficial to the large organization.  Most had budgets that would only allow 
some assets to be expended towards personnel development.  Resources were a vital enabler of 
the CISO’s ability to perform the information security program.  Funds were dispersed and the 
CISO always balanced the addressing of risk by its highest priority.  Often the CISO did not have 
enough, but did make do with the amounts of funding allotted to them. 
Therefore, as presented in Figure 8, CISO Actions to Achieve a Strategy, this represents 
all the actions associated with the CISO achieving strategy.  The interview question rationale 
was sound and resulted in the grounded theory coding process of all the collected data to reveal a 
theory.   The story emerging from the data and hence the theory coming forth from the data fits 
this statement: The CISO selects a role to align with the mission and develops a strategy 
(complexities) that uses available resources.  The statement can be shortened form is the CISO 
actions to achieve a strategy and in a longer form could be the following story.  The CISO 
starting with compliance as a role works with business and information systems in alignment to 
develop a strategy that addresses mission risk adequately with a budget to support qualified 
personnel adequately trained and equipped with pertinent tools.  The CISO adjusts the role to suit 
the needs of addressing mission risk to the business and information system executives.    
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion, Implications, Limitations, and Recommendations 
5.1 Introduction 
Through this study, the research has been around investigating information security 
strategy and the roles a CISO can choose to implement it (Chen, et al., 2010; Leidner, et al., 
2011), how the information security strategy and role selection can be advanced and to be more 
proactive (Seeholzer, 2012).  And, that this advancement can contribute towards yielding a 
proactive implementation of a strategy through the proper role selection, alignment direction, and 
usage of resources towards accomplishing objectives.  Future research may validate the theory 
that emerged from the collected data in Chapter 4 and resultant model of the CISO actions to 
achieve a strategy. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The results of this study led to an understanding of the complexities with information 
security strategy in a large government organization.  It revealed a theory that can help CISOs to 
ascertain whether certain types of information security strategy are preferable to other forms of 
information security strategy and how to tailor it.  The study might also prove helpful to evaluate 
how information security strategies differ within large governmental organizations, by using the 
model to investigate specific scenarios, depending upon the variables supplied for all the inputs.  
This study’s findings might feed into an advanced theory of role selection to assist information 
security professionals in selecting role(s) appropriate to implementation of an information 
security program.   
The researcher asserted that from the review and analysis of the available literature and 
data collected, that several results came from the analysis.  One of the expected results found that 
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many of the role categories advanced in the literature review, held as written.  Some participants 
expressed the roles with differing names, but the categories tracked along the same explanations 
advanced for the categories in the review of the literature.  It did come to pass that four of the 
role categories proved to be somewhat inconsequential in a large government organization.  
Those roles were public image, competitor, re-organization and power relationships.  The 
categories identified in roles, even though found inconsequential in the large government 
organization, may however hold up under educational, commercial, or other public sector 
environments.  The review of the literature did advance several cases in the commercial sector 
for the categories listed as inconsequential. 
The section of the literature review on alignment of strategies did find the same 
categories, but with differing results.  The majority of CISOs in the public sector had fewer 
written strategies as opposed to the ideals presented in the literature review.  This was verified 
from the interviews, as CISOs expressed their support of the business and information systems 
strategies, but identified the lack of their own information security strategies.  Further, the 
interviews revealed a severe lack of models for dealing with strategy inside of information 
security offices within organizations. 
The results of the collected data revealed more than just definitions of information 
security and basic information about the information security program.  Most of the CISOs went 
into detailed discussions of obstacles and challenges they faced on a near daily basis as they 
struggled to prevent data loss breaches and incident responses to the new threats and exploits the 
network is exposed to from every entry point (Hutchins, Cloppert, & Amin, 2011; OIG, 2012; 
Suddaby, 2006).  Table 20, Challenges and Obstacles, gleaned the major challenges CISOs faced 
within their organizations. 
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Some CISOs led complicated discussions of how information security supported and 
often supplemented the business strategy, adding value in unexpected areas.  For example, in 
cases where security is involved from the start, it gets built in and prevents unnecessary 
expenditures later on.  The researcher conducted the interviews using a repeatable process, with 
the results that all the interviews reflected unbiased views from the differing sub organizations of 
the large organization, that all ended up supporting an overall organizational security program 
(Duffy, et al., 2006; Hirose, Itao, & Umeda, 2012; Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). 
Table 20. Challenges and Obstacles 
Respondent Challenge Faced 
G7 -Helping the organization see the big picture of information security was often a 
challenge.  Often I had to devise creative ways, many times behind the scenes to 
get some semblance of information security incorporated into the system. 
H8 -The challenge for us is that we have a lot of things to do, but our budget is so 
severely slashed.  So it has been really hard to do.  
-It was a challenge to try and align all the various strategies, plans and guide 
books for the overall organization.  Also, the White House came out with things 
to make it harder still to align all the pieces. 
M7 - We are always fighting over budget, having the budget authority to obtain the 
necessary equipment.  The CIO has a different prioritization which tends to be a 
challenge. 
V8 - I have the challenge of sub organizations.  I have to build on information 
security strategy that is compelling enough that others will want to align with 
ours.  I do not do it in a vacuum.  I don’t want to put it in a paper and make it 
something they must, but rather something they went to support and adopt. What 
do I need to push to have them get behind it.  Get them involved rather with you, 
then you can get buy-in.  
-Often times the challenge of the job here is that we have all the responsibilities 
and accountability, but we do not have the authority.  Even though the Clinger 
Cohen Act gives it, we do not have the authority.  You have to have the ability 
to have political influence to get them to move priority to catch up and get done. 
X9 - There is a problem in quantifying the risk.  With this, it is challenging to build 
a repeatable process.  I built the proposed model for characterizing threat, but I 
do not know if it reached the point of repeatability.  It is very hard to build the 
repeatable process and without a repeatable process it is even harder to get 
measurements or metrics of the process. 
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5.3 Implications 
Since the fundamental understanding of information security roles used to implement an 
information security strategy in an organization is lacking, most implementations in government 
organizations equated the information security strategy to a technically related solution, 
implementing tools and monitoring controls (Seeholzer, 2012).  This was supported by the 
interviews conducted with the majority of CISOs as they highlighted their ad-hoc security 
environments.  The challenge is to distribute the information presented in this study, so that the 
CISOs can assist executives in aligning strategic goals and objectives and help them in 
developing roles that fit into an agreeable alignment.  The use of constructivist grounded theory 
complicated and required interpretive skills to correctly delve into the collected data and extract 
the categories from the myriad levels of responses given by the executives taking part.  
Considerable time was necessary to arrive at a coherent story through coding of the data and use 
of comparative analysis.   
5.4 Limitations 
The main limitation was obtaining unbiased responses from the participants.  For each of 
the interviews, the researcher kept the interviews unrehearsed, not allowing the CISOs to 
preview the questions prior to the interview, it was a spontaneous discussion of the questions.  
The researcher also limited the boundary of the questions, remaining explicitly in the arena of 
information security strategy and the roles an individual could assume to meet the objectives and 
goals.  A delimitation for this study kept the study focused solely on the questions without 
deviating from the subject; maintaining the same core questions with each participant.  The 
researcher also kept distant with the participant in order to obtain unbiased responses.   
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Another limitation was the population selected the number of CISOs in the geographic 
area was limited.  The generalizability to the greater population was a consideration, in that the 
research utilized individuals residing within the National Capital Region of the United States, 
generally around the greater Washington, DC area.  Even though this study queried respondents 
from each of the sub units of the large government organization, it might not represent all 
organizations.  Further, since it is difficult to assimilate the key factors from all studies within the 
information security domain, it cannot be assumed that all roles influencing information security 
strategy were represented within this study.  It could be surmised that other roles not part of this 
study may impact an information security strategy of an organization.  
Finally, while participants were assured of non-disclosure and that data was collected in a 
way to minimize respondent reservation, it would be difficult to ensure respondents were 
completely free of mistrust.  There could be some underlying fear of providing information 
security information to an outside source.  This assumption has been seen as problematic when 
conducting research into information security areas (Kotulic & Clark, 2004). 
5.5 Recommendations 
The phenomena or properties of the roles a CISO must consider needs to encompass how 
to address threats, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses common to the information security strategy 
(Ransbotham, Mitra, & Ramsey, 2012).  The information security field stands on the precipice of 
going from a purely reactive world, addressing threat as it is discovered to be one of a more 
predictive nature of the threats being encountered prior to an actual exploit.  CISOs currently and 
expressly focus on a reactive approach documenting and implementing static controls to protect 
data and assets under their purview.  This must change in that as the protections increase the 
threat moves to other more unprotected areas.  For example, the main CISO of an organization 
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lobbied and obtained permission to block webmail, the single greatest entry point of malware, 
through directed emails, attachment downloading, and execution.  Now, threat actors have 
moved and evolved their attacks towards other attack vectors as Heartbleed (Durumeric, et al., 
2014) and Bash/Shellshock did (Security Research and Emergency Response Center of Anity 
Labs (Anity CERT), 2014; Trend Micro Threat Research Lab (TMTRL, 2014) in an attempt to 
gain logon credentials.  CISOs need to adapt and change from reactive towards a more proactive 
approach.  The beginnings of this shift were gleaned from the interview responses to the 
interview questions, such as “…what capabilities are necessary for a successful information 
security strategy?” (Chapter 3, Table 5, Interview Question Rationale).  This question found a 
shift in response from CISOs of the desire to move from reactive towards a proactive outcome.  
Respondent M7 (personal communication, April 14, 2014) said the CISO must, “Clearly 
articulate the risk of a decision by management that would put data at risk and it must be 
proactive and not reactive in decisions.”  The researcher gained a vision for a trend of moving 
from reactive, through an interim stage of a hybrid approach with both reactive and proactive 
approaches, and then towards a more proactive, threat driven approach.  Figure 9, Trends, 
illustrates the move from a reactive to a proactive information security program. 
 
Figure 9. Trends 
Protect Data & 
Assets
Operations & 
Risk
Threat Driven
Trends
Reactive ProactiveHybrid
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Future work can expand into how this could take place and how roles, alignments, and 
strategy (complexities) adapt to the new fluid environment.  Lastly, CISOs indicated that for 
years, the model of a hardened perimeter has held and was easily defended against.  Now 
however, with the introduction of cloud, mobile, big data, virtualization, and other emerging 
technologies, those boundaries no longer hold.  How does the CISO change to react to the new 
paradigm of network layers vice a perimeter defense model?  These would be areas to explore in 
the future. 
The relevance and significance of the study adds to the knowledge base around 
understanding the complexities of information security strategies and roles associated in 
adopting methods to accomplish the goals and objectives of the information security strategy.  
The problem developed in that the complexity of an information security strategy has not been 
explored for developing strategy and the selection of roles to support it.  The population segment 
of the information security community affected by this phenomenon are executives in 
information security, the CISOs and other executives charged with oversight of information 
security for an organization.  The problem ranges over all of the organizations with information 
security programs and to a lesser extent in smaller organizations.  The focus of the study 
centered on large government organizations, but might be helpful if the emerging model scales 
down to smaller organizations or could be scaled to fit any size organization in the public sector.   
Adapting the findings by applying the theory may result in tailoring an information security 
strategy and role development for organizations.   
Other studies might attempt to address the problems of complexity, but possibly might 
not arrive with a theory for selecting a role development model for information security strategy.  
Without the theory developed here, the perpetuation of role selection schizophrenia will 
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continue, with a reactive selection of roles to address immediate problems as they occur instead 
of evaluating an overall direction and proactively investigating root causes to eliminate the core 
of the problem.  Too often the easier route is to gain temporary results, than to address the root 
problem.  Avoiding it will only see the problem resurface six months to a year later in the same 
vein; albeit with slight modifications, such as the newest variant of a virus to fool the heuristic 
analysis of an anti-virus program.  The introduction of Stuxnet (Lee, 2012), followed by Flame 
(Bencsáth, Pék, Buttyán, and Félegyházi, 2014), and then by Regin (Symantec Security 
Response (SSR), 2014) illustrates the adaptive nature of the threat that CISOs and businesses 
must adapt to in order to secure data and assets. 
This research study addressed the issue of information security strategy complexity by 
offering a theory that allows the practitioner to assess, analyze, and adapt roles for meeting the 
objectives and goals of the information security program through said strategy.  Implementation 
of the theory will assist in proactively addressing the need to get past the cyclic reactive nature of 
information security and get to a proactive culture of security moving forward in an organization.  
Acceptance of the theory and testing of various organizational sizes and types will prove its 
generalizability and usefulness across a spectrum of organizations.  Future studies may consider 
other qualitative methods.  Also, further implementation may lead to organizations adopting the 
theory, creating a model and quantifiably test the theory for empirical data. 
5.6 Summary 
This study presented research that has implications for practitioners of information 
security.   On one level, organizations having reactive information security strategies will find 
guidance to assist in their efforts to identify which role to select to accomplish their information 
security program goals and objectives.  Organizations with large and unfocused information 
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security can utilize the findings to focus their role selection to proactively accomplish the goals 
and objectives identified in their information security strategy.  Having a more focused selection 
process will save an organization money and time.   Finally, the theory developed from emergent 
data will allow a CISO to adapt to changing situations according to the data supplied by outside 
factors.  Once establishing the theory and testing empirically, then further usage of the theory 
may take place to develop metrics and measures to lend to the quantitative testing of the model 
and provide further empirical evidence of the model’s effectiveness.  
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1. In your opinion, what is information security strategy? 
  
2. What does security strategy mean to you? And to this organization? 
 
3. What is the role you take to accomplish information security strategy? 
  
4. Can you elaborate on how you arrive with your strategic priorities for information 
security? 
  
5. Can you describe the model (framework or system) of your information security 
strategy?   
 
6. Can you describe how the implementation of information security strategy is tracked? 
 
7. Thinking of security strategy, how do you manage the priorities of the large 
organization? 
 
8. Can you explain what capabilities are necessary for a successful information security 
strategy? 
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Table B. Overall Interview Analysis 
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A0 X     X     X       X       X       
B3   X   X       X                   X 
B8 X X   X         X X X     X X       
C7   X   X     X         X           X 
D2   X             X         X       X 
E3   X X       X   X         X         
F5 X X     X   X     X X     X       X 
G7   X X X       X   X X             X 
H8   X   X       X             X     X 
I5 X X         X   X         X X       
J7   X   X             X     X   X   X 
K2   X   X     X       X       X     X 
K5 X     X   X           X   X X       
L9 X               X         X X       
M2 X   X       X       X     X X       
M7   X X       X     X X             X 
N5 X X   X     X     X X     X       X 
O9   X   X         X   X   X         X 
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T8   X   X           X X           X   
U2 X   X       X   X         X X     X 
V8 X   X       X   X     X   X X       
W3 X     X     X             X X       
X4 X X   X     X           X X       X 
X9 X     X   X     X X       X X   X   
Y4   X   X     X               X     X 
Z7   X   X         X X       X     X   
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Table B1, Overall Interview Analysis, consists of an overall evaluation of each of the interviews 
and classifying them under four separate areas.  First, each respondent’s interview was evaluated 
for being proactive, reactive, or having elements of each within the interview responses given to 
the interviewer.  The second area considers the respondent’s status as having a strategy of some 
sort, not having one, or stating they do not need a strategy.  By some sort, the person either had a 
written strategy, one in the process of approval, or used a higher level organizational information 
security strategy.  The two instances of stating they did not need a strategy stems from the fact 
that the respondent stated they used the chief information officers (CIOs) strategy instead of an 
information security strategy. The third area under review evaluated the strategy alignment that 
the respondent steered their organization towards, either business, business and information 
systems, information systems, information security, or ad hoc alignments.  There were instances 
where a respondent exhibited more than one type of alignment.  The fourth area evaluated the 
respondent’s role as described in response to the interview questions as either one of the 
following or a combination of multiple roles: top down, public image, competitor, continual 
change, best practice, re-organizer, power relationship, and or compliance. 
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